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2INTRODUCTION
Since Derrida appeared on the legal radar in the 1980’s, his texts have been discussed and 
referred to in numerous legal works.  Such references have varied from the sympathetic to the 
downright hostile.  Almost without exception, the hostile readings are characterized by a 
superficial reading of Derrida… [and] the sympathetic readings unfortunately sometimes fare 
little better… [being] similarly informed by a lack of appreciation for Derrida’s broader 
[deconstructive] project…”1
Jacques de Ville, Law as Absolute Hospitality
The purpose of this thesis is to reconsider (in the wake of the many mis-considerations recognized 
by de Ville) the question of what a legal “deconstruction” might entail – especially one which 
would be performed by a judge; when the stakes are at their highest.  From the very start, this 
project requires two clarifying notes:
1. I use the word “deconstruction” as shorthand for the interpretive style and philosophy of French 
theorist, Jacques Derrida.  This means that, when I ask how deconstruction might relate to the 
practice of legal interpretation, I am asking (in a very specific sense) how Derrida’s work 
relates to legal interpretation – not how the work of Hillis Miller2 or Paul de Man3 or any other 
self-professed “deconstructionist” relates to it.
2. Rather than trying to criticize Derrida, I simply want to offer as faithful and honest an 
interpretation of his work as I can muster.  This isn’t to imply that Derrida is somehow immune 
from criticism, but rather that, for me, a reinterpretation which strives to grasp Derrida’s 
philosophy on his terms is a non-negotiable pre-requisite to any such criticism.
Keeping these notes in mind, I now want to kick-off my analysis by re-asking a question (the
question perhaps) which has plagued readers of Derrida from the time of his earliest publications –
the question as to the “nature” of deconstruction (i.e. the question of “what it is?”).  We should not 
be thrown off by the seeming simplicity of this question; on the contrary – it demands a lengthy and 
complex answer, and we should therefore waste no time getting to it.  With this in mind, let us 
proceed.
                                               
1 Jacques de Ville, Law as Absolute Hospitality (Routledge, 2011) p.2
2 See, for example, Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (Yale University Press, 1982)
3 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading (Columbia University Press, 1989)
3CHAPTER ONE:
WHAT IS
DECONSTRUCTION?
(OR THE “SPIRIT” OF
DECONSTRUCTION)
“Mark the first page of a book with a red ribbon, for the wound is inscribed at its beginning...”
Edmond Jabes, The Book of Questions4
                                               
4 Quoted in Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabes and the Question of the Book” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference
(Routledge, 2001) p.83 – Hereafter referenced as “Jabes and the Question”
4WHAT IS DECONSTRUCTION? (OR THE “SPIRIT” OF DECONSTRUCTION):
INTRODUCTION:
What is deconstruction?
“Nothing”5 declares Derrida – a declaration which is but one of his many answers to the above 
question.6  What kind of answer is this?  An oxymoronic one, certainly: has the mere inscription of 
the word “deconstruction” not already marked it as some-thing – a word or a sequence of letters or a 
marking on this page?  The paradoxical question then, is how can something (i.e. deconstruction) 
can also be nothing?  How a thing can also be no-thing?
The answer, I think, is implied in the last word of this question – no-thing.  Deconstruction is no-
thing.  Does this not already hint at some other mode of categorization?  Deconstruction clearly is –
I am writing about it; you are reading about it – but it is not a thing.  And yet, what else can the 
word “is” point toward except a “thing”?  This is the paralyzing difficulty of writing/speaking about 
deconstruction: if it is not-a-thing then it is not, and if it is not, then aren’t we out of lexicological 
options?7  In other words, does Derrida’s defining deconstruction as “nothing” not put it beyond 
language (and even beyond comprehension) in general?
The answer (as I see it) is both yes and no.  To briefly explain: the nothingness of deconstruction is 
an essentially self-inflicted wound – a by-product of its own complex movement.  We can certainly 
try and describe this movement, but this description will fail unless it includes the recognition of its 
own invalidity; unless it simultaneously posits and refuses itself.8  In this sense, the only way to 
really build upon Derrida’s seemingly hollow definition is by:
                                               
5 Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend” in David Wood & Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and Différance
(Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.5 – Hereafter referenced as “Letter to a Japanese Friend”
6 For example: “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X’ or ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point, 
which is to say that they are at least false” – ibid, p.4
7 Derrida’s response to this difficulty was often to write “sous rature” (i.e. “under erasure”) by scoring out words like 
“is” or “thing” – words which he felt to be both theoretically misleading and indispensible.  We might hijack this 
technique (and Derrida’s own words) as an additional means of clarification: deconstruction “is [an] ill-named thing” –
ill-named because it is named at all, but named nonetheless because it has to be.  For a more extensive explanation of 
this technique, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” in Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (John 
Hopkins University Press, 1997) p.xiv – Hereafter referenced as “OG” (excluding Spivak’s preface)
8 This was always Derrida’s approach to talking about deconstruction – to keep revising himself in the recognition that 
his words would never quite touch their object.  This approach can be sharply distinguished from, for example, 
Wittgenstein’s claim that we must pass over the “beyond” of language in silence.  See Johan van der Walt, “Law and 
Deconstruction” in Veitch, Christodoulidis & Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes & Concepts (Routledge, 2012)
51. Tracing what I have called the “movement” of deconstruction;
2. Explaining why this movement blocks and effaces the possibility of its own description, and;
3. Suggesting that, given its penchant for self-effacement, deconstruction is best understood as 
something mystical – a “spirit” perhaps – rather than the tightly-hemmed and repeatable method 
which many literary theorists (for example) have supposed it to be.9
In one sense, this proposed “spirit” of deconstruction will be no safer from its own effects than a 
more technical interpretation.  But in another sense, talking about deconstruction as a certain kind 
of “spirit” can, I think, help us to see what might otherwise be concealed – namely that 
deconstruction is never about its seeming objects (i.e. Western philosophy and language) but about 
that which exceeds them: the “unsayable,”10 the “impossible,”11 the mystical.
                                               
9 In particular, see Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror (Harvard University Press, 1986) pp.255 – 318.  Hereafter 
referenced as “Gasche”
10 Johan van der Walt, “Law and Deconstruction” in Veitch, Christodoulidis & Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes & 
Concepts (Routledge, 2012)
11 For a summary of the link between deconstruction and the impossible, see Martin McQuillan, “Introduction: Five 
Strategies for Deconstruction” in Martin McQuillan, Deconstruction: A Reader (Routledge, 2001) pp.3 – 8
6SECTION I: THE APORIA OF THE BEGINNING
“We must begin somewhere, but there is no absolutely justified beginning...”12
Geoffrey Bennington, Derridabase
This is one incarnation of the aporia which, I think, always lies at the heart (i.e. the “beginning”13) 
of Derrida’s work.  “We must begin”14 – but we have no-where to begin, no “absolutely justified” 
point of departure.  What does this mean?  Specifically:
1.   What “we”?
2.   In what sense must we begin?
3.   In what sense must we begin?
4.   What is it about this sense of “beginning” that is so unjustifiable (and even, as we will see, 
“unjust”15)?
The purpose of this section is to answer these questions by constructing a point-by-point 
explanation of Derrida’s/Bennington’s aporia.  Although the type of explanation which I want to 
give is perhaps more readily identifiable with discussions of aporia in Derrida’s later work (i.e. in 
the wake of his so-called “ethico-political turn”16) I want to try and fuse it with the terminology and 
vital concerns of his earlier writings: especially his preoccupation with the “institution of the sign”17
as an existential baseline.  This is not, for me at least, a forced or synthetic fusion.  Rather, it is 
simply my way of highlighting the deep-set continuity between the various “turns” of Derrida’s 
work – a continuity which, I think, enables us to talk about a cohesive/enduring “spirit” of 
deconstruction over and above what may seem like focal shifts in Derrida’s thought.  With these 
concerns in mind, let us proceed to the explanation.
                                               
12 Geoffrey Bennington, Derridabase (University of Chicago Press, 1993) p.15 – Hereafter referenced as “Bennington”
13 This should, I think, be taken with a grain of salt.  Because if Derrida’s work refuses the possibility of an “absolutely 
justified beginning” then there will be no “absolute” justification for my suggestion that there is a proper “heart” of 
Derrida’s work. However, as the first term of the aporia suggests, we still “must begin” – even if the most we can give 
is a persuasive or “strategic” (see Bennington, p.15) justification for this beginning.
14 Derrida uses these exact words: “we must begin wherever we are” – See OG, p.162
15 See section two of this chapter (and also my discussion of Derrida’s “Force of Law” in chapter two) for an 
explanation of this claim.
16 Pheng Cheah, “The Untimely Secret of Democracy” in Pheng Cheah & Suzanne Guerlac, Derrida and the Time of 
the Political (Duke University Press, 2009) p.74
17 OG, p.44
7Phase I: “...we must begin...”
 “To begin” – without suffixation but referring specifically to “us” (i.e. human beings) – can be 
taken to denote one’s entry into existence.
 For Derrida, as for Heidegger, our lives are always “bound up in relations of practical 
concern.”18  We don’t exist at odds with the world (as some disconnected, “Cartesian”19
“thinking thing”20) but “in-the-world... with-others”21 – a la Heidegger’s Dasein.
 However, our ability to cope with the “in-ness”22 or “facticity”23 of life is far from naturally 
endowed.  Rather, it depends upon our recourse to an artificial “technique” which 
“supplements”24 our naked, biological existence (i.e. what the Greeks called “zoe... the simple 
fact of living common to all living beings”25).  That “technique” is language.
 To explain: without language, we would exist amongst-others rather than “with” them in the 
Heideggerian sense.  The “detour of the sign”26 then, is what allows us to transcend this state of 
solitary “amongst-ness” by providing us with the ability to interact, to engage, and to be “with-
others” (i.e. “in-the-world” in a meaningful sense).
 In other words, language arrives on the scene as a matter of sheer necessity – as the practical 
arrangement which ensures our ability to cope with the inescapable social requirements of 
“factical”27 life.  
                                               
18 Jeff Collins & Howard Selina, Introducing Heidegger (Totem Books, 2010) p.61 – Hereafter referenced as 
“Introducing Heidegger”
19 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996) especially pp.12 – 23
20 Simon Critchley, “Being and Time: ‘Being-in-the-world’” at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/22/heidegger-religion-philosophy?intcmp=239
21 Introducing Heidegger, pp.55 – 63; It is also worth noting Simon Critchley’s definition of Heidegger’s “Being-in-the-
world”: “the world itself is part of the fundamental constitution of what it means to be human... I am not a free-floating 
self or ego facing a world of objects that stands over and against me... rather... the world is part and parcel of my being, 
of the fabric of my existence” – See Simon Critchley, “Being and Time: ‘Being-in-the-world’” at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/22/heidegger-religion-philosophy?intcmp=239
22 ibid, p.61
23 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 2005) p.vii
24 See OG, pp.141 – 157
25 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (Stanford University Press, 1998) p.1 – Hereafter referenced as “Agamben”
26 Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (The Harvester Press, 1982) p.9 – Hereafter 
referenced as “Différance”
27 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Indiana University Press, 1987) p.1 – Hereafter referenced as “Radical 
Hermeneutics”
8 For Derrida, this turn to language – which he refers to as a “moment of economy”28 – does “not 
depend upon a choice that could have been avoided”29 or redirected.  This is largely because of 
the practical necessity of interaction, but also (and this is crucial) because we never experience 
anything like a pre-linguistic “moment” – even one in which our recourse to language would be 
pre-determined.  Rather, when we enter the world, we simultaneously enter language as an 
unavoidable inheritance: we receive it, “like the law”30 says Saussure.
 We might object: it is possible to conceive of a life untouched by language – one raised in 
silence, kept in the dark.31  But for Derrida, the non-lingual character of even this life melts
away when we take the “logic of the supplement”32 into account.  To explain: “there is no 
idyllic state of nature before the advent”33 of language because such a state would – insofar as 
language is our ticket to the social realm – still feel the anti-social ache of its lack, which is to 
say that it would still be haunted by the dream (and the essentiality) of language in its social 
promise.34
 And so language (i.e. the concept of the sign) is always at the beginning35 – not as some 
external add-on (i.e. one which would impose itself upon our “bare life”36 as an artificial 
enhancement) but as an integral/irreducible part of our existence.  However: the status of this 
existence-in-language (and “in-the-world”) is far from clear cut, and many of the statements 
above will require amendment or even refutation according to the terms of the second 
phase/pole of Derrida’s aporia.
                                               
28 OG, p.7
29 ibid, p.7
30 Bennington, p.26 (paraphrasing Saussure)
31 For example, Peter Stillman, Jr. in Auster’s City of Glass – a character whose father raised him in silence as a means 
of linguistic experimentation.  See Paul Auster, “City of Glass” in Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy (Faber & Faber, 
2004)
32 Christopher Norris, Derrida (Fontana Press, 1987) p.98 – Hereafter referenced as “Norris”
33 ibid, p.98
34 This should be distinguished from Aristotle’s claim (in The Nichomachean Ethics) that nature can be 
receptive/facilitative to the unnatural.  Derrida’s “supplementarity” is more radical: it involves arguing that the 
supposedly unnatural already lives within the natural – that the unnatural (i.e. the technical) is a necessary part of nature 
(i.e. primordiality) and that this puts the very idea of nature (i.e. self-sufficient, enclosed purity) into question.  
Reference:  Aristotle, The Nichomachan Ethics (Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996) p.33
35 Bennington agrees: “Derrida... asserts, from the beginning, that the sign is at the beginning... which will very rapidly 
imply that there is no beginning.”  In other words, since the sign is a mark of secondariness, any attempt to suggest its 
primordiality will also be the destruction of primordiality itself (“putting into question the value of arkhe” –
“Différance” p.6) – See Bennington, p.24
36 See Agamben, p.120 (amongst many other pages)
9Phase II: “...there is no absolutely justified beginning...”
 “To begin” – philosophically speaking – is to think (or perform) in a “metaphysical”37 fashion.  
For Derrida, this means “returning strategically, ideally, to an origin or to a priority thought to 
be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of 
derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc...”38
 This gesture can be understood in several ways.  In a narrow sense, it can refer to a way of 
thinking which Derrida recognizes as endemic across the history of Western philosophy –
namely the tendency to construct grandiose theories of “knowledge” which work from some 
self-standing point of “conceptual bedrock”39 (e.g. “Plato’s forms, Hegel’s dialectic... 
Nietzsche’s will-to-power”40, etc.) towards a “reconstruction in order.”41  But in a broader sense 
– as Irene Harvey notes – metaphysics is also Derrida’s name for the ever-invasive “condition” 
(in every sense of the word: habitat, disease, etc.) of our linguistic existence.  In other words, 
metaphysics = language itself.42
 Here’s one way to think about this equation: the idea of language is the idea of the “postal 
principle”43 – of the division of the sign into packaging (i.e. the signifier, or phonic/graphic 
substance) and contents (i.e. the signified, or conceptual identity).  This means that when I 
speak/write, there is an implied assumption that anyone who receives my words as 
sounds/shapes will also receive certain “irreducible kernel[s]”44 of meaning which would, by 
definition, be “simple, intact... pure”45 etc.
                                               
37 Alternative definition: “[The] structure of... seeking for answers, for understanding, for conceivability, for meaning 
itself” – See Irene Harvey, “Derrida and the Concept of Metaphysics” in Research in Phenomenology (Volume XIII) 
p.116 – Hereafter referenced as “Harvey”
38 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Northwestern University Press, 1998) p.236
39 Jack Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” (96 The Yale Law Journal 1987) p.746
40 David Wood & Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and Différance (Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.xi
41 Bennington, p.15
42 Harvey, p.117; also, consider the following excerpt from Derrida’s Positions: “...‘everyday language’ is not innocent 
or neutral... it is the language of Western metaphysics” – See Jacques Derrida, Positions (Continuum, 2004) p.18 –
Hereafter referenced as “Positions”
43 Radical Hermeneutics, p.160
44 OG, p.44
45 “communication... in effect implies a transmission charged with making a pass, from one subject to another, the 
identity... of a meaning or of a concept rightfully separable... from the signifying operation” – See Positions, p.22
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 However, according to Derrida, “there is no intact kernel”46 – no fleck of conceptual substance 
from which a given sign is inseparable.  I shall return to this later, but for now it should be 
enough to say that Derrida thinks of meaning in much the same way as Nietzsche47 – as 
determined, in the end, by a certain “residual... freedom”48 possessed by the language-user
rather than the sovereignty of some static signified.49
 One consequence of this “de-kernelization” is that it tends to negate the possibility of genuine 
(i.e. meaningful) social contact.  This is not to say that the functional/practical benefits of 
language are an illusion, but rather that they come at the cost of any social
experience/engagement which would exceed this practicality.
 Consider the following by way of explanation: for Derrida, every instance of language-use 
carries the performative assumption that some-thing (i.e. some “kernel”) will be received by 
other homo-lingual “users” who come into contact with it.  But if these kernels are subjectively 
determined (as Derrida suggests) then a second assumption kicks in – namely that our 
subjective operations are similar enough to facilitate inter-subjective coalescence.50
 This is why social contact via language can never be genuine: because it depends upon the 
implied assumption that no other is actually Other – an assumption which reduces others to 
“interior representation[s]” whose subjective trajectories necessarily correspond to those of the 
representing subject.  In other words, communication is never between subjects, but within them 
(i.e. between one subject and an array of dead-eyed holograms).
                                               
46 Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other (Schocken Books, 1985) p.115
47 “Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them...” – Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Will to Power (Vintage, 1968) p.327; also, consider the following quote from Derrida’s Grammatology: “Nietzsche, far 
from remaining simply (with Hegel and as Heidegger wished) within metaphysics, contributed a great deal to the 
liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to... truth or the primary signified” –
OG, p.19
48 David Wood, “Différance and the Problem of Strategy” in David Wood & Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and 
Difference (Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.66
49 Consider the following quotes as illustrative of this “residual... freedom” thesis:
1. “...everything comes down to the ear you are able to hear me with... all will be listening to me with one or the other 
sort of ear... to which the coherence and continuity of my trajectory will have seemed evident from my first words...” 
– Jacques Derrida, “Otobiographies” in Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other (Schocken Books, 1985) p.4
2. “...my remarks... would have no interest except on the condition of being unwrapped in one fashion or another, 
everyone having his or her own idea on that subject and thus his or her own impatience...” – Jacques Derrida, 
Points... Interviews, 1974 – 1994 (Stanford University Press, 1995) p.175
50 Although there is (in reality) no order to these assumptions – they are interlinked and inter-implicating.
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 This is the cruel logic of language.  We need it to (meaningfully) enter the world – to cope with 
the basic requirements of “factical” life – but it can’t enable any more than a superficial 
entrance into this world because it never really lets us experience anything beyond ourselves51
(i.e. no point of “radical alterity”52).  This is why Derrida, in Positions, refers to language as a 
“simultaneous impediment and progress”53 – because in terms of its basic function, it is both 
road and roadblock/poison and cure.54
 This all adds together to explain why there is “no absolutely justified beginning.”  Simply put, 
there is no absolute at all – no pure truth, no irreducible kernel, and no facilitative sameness 
between subjects.  There is, to borrow Derrida’s famous words, “nothing outside the text”55 –
no “transcendental signified”56 against which our language-use can be referenced and justified.
                                               
51 Two additional notes:
1. This means that we have to go back (partially) on our prior suggestion that we live “with-others” rather than merely 
“amongst” them.  In functional/practical terms, this suggestion still holds.  But any sense of meaningful engagement 
– of really experiencing others – is an illusion.
2. And in this sense, we might say that Derrida’s life-view is an undecidable suspension between Heidegger’s 
“facticity” and Cartesian solitude.  In other words, we are in a certain sense both “with” and “amongst” others.
52 Gasche, p.148
53 Positions, p.17
54 In “Plato’s Pharmacy” Derrida picks up on Plato’s use of the Greek word “pharmakon” – a word which can signify 
both poison and cure (much like the English word “drug”).  Although Plato uses the term with specific reference to the 
status of the written word, Derrida claims (as we will see) that all language can be subsumed under the concept of 
writing and that the “pharmakon” label, therefore, is applicable to every linguistic form.  See Jacques Derrida, 
Dissemination (University of Chicago Press, 2004) pp.63 – 171
55 OG, p.163
56 Norris, p.85
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Chapter Plan: The “Spirit” of Deconstruction
Derrida’s aporia – the “aporia of the beginning” – leaves us with a torrentially bleak portrait of 
human existence.  Its status as an aporia (an impasse, a dead end, etc.) seems to trap us in a “prison-
house”57 of language; doomed to live our lives alone.  And yet, in this experience of what Derrida 
calls “undecidability”58 (i.e. a tragic suspension between two poles or oppositional movements) we 
can catch a faint glimmer of something alternative and refreshing – something which is utterly 
foreign to the order of metaphysics.  This (i.e. counter-metaphysical foreignness) is what really 
interests Derrida, and my task now is therefore to explain:
1. The difficult method through which this foreignness is exposed;
2. The “spirit” or character of this foreignness, at least as Derrida sees it;
3. And why the exposure of this foreignness is so called-for; so necessary.
The remainder of this chapter will address the first two of these points, with point three saved for 
chapter two.  I will address the first point over the course of three sections relating to Derrida’s first 
extended assault on metaphysical security: Of Grammatology.  The first two of these sections will 
offer an introduction to the Grammatology – its style, its themes, and its relationship to the aporia of 
the beginning.  The third section will focus specifically on “method” – the limits within which 
Derrida instigates and regulates his “deconstruction” of metaphysics.  As for the second point, it has 
already been hinted at through the logic of Derrida’s aporia.  But I will return to it – especially in 
section six – so as to explicitly set out some of Derrida’s earlier, “quasi-transcendental”59 attempts 
to conceptualize this mystical beyond.  These concepts will then be re-spun in chapter two, as we 
begin to spill into the third point: the “why?” of deconstruction; the sense in which it is always so 
called-for.
                                               
57 A term borrowed from Christopher Norris: the “prison-house of concepts” – see Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2002) p.4
58 See Rodolphe Gasche, “Infrastructures and Systematicity” in John Sallis, Deconstruction and Philosophy (University 
of Chicago Press, 1987) p.10
59 See Bennington, pp.267 – 284
13
SECTION II: METAPHYSICS = REPRESSION (AN EXTENDED NOTE...)
Before pursuing my chapter plan, I want to make a quick addition to the previous section by 
recalling my earlier claim that a particular “beginning” (i.e. a metaphysical hark-back to ideality) 
will not only lack “absolute” justification, but will also be (in a certain way) unjust.  Pending a 
more detailed description, we can – for now – restrict ourselves to blaming this “unjustness” on two 
features of the metaphysical gesture:
1. Its lack of any “absolute” justification (as per the previous section) and;
2. Its negative impact upon what Derrida calls the “Other”60 – a term which most typically refers 
to the other language-user.
One way of understanding this negative impact is in terms of repression.  To explain: the language-
user’s performative return to ideality marks, as Freud says of repression, a “withdraw[al of] 
interest”61 – specifically from those flickers of signifying potential which lie beyond the presumed 
pinpoint of ideality; beyond the supposedly “true”62 meaning of the words used. This might seem 
like an innocuously passive movement, but then again – following Derrida’s line in texts like 
“Force of Law”63 – can inaction and disinterest not be just as violent as active aggression?  Isn’t this 
the moral of K’s bureaucratic nightmare in The Castle64?
Far from being a matter of merely theoretical importance, the repressive character of 
metaphysics/language has what we could expediently refer to as “real world” consequences –
specifically regarding the language-user’s existence-with-others.  This is because (as I suggested 
before) language can only let us see others as pre-accounted self-reflections, thereby repressing any 
meaningful conception of their individuality or depth.  And from here, it is hard not to see a heavily 
implied politics of negative imposition – of conceit, of narrow-mindedness, and of self-importance. 
But I digress: let us keep these ideas in mind and keep the rest for chapter two.
                                               
60 And, as Derrida suggests, the question of justice (i.e. ethics) begins with the “Other” – “there is no ethics without the 
presence of the other” – see OG, pp.139 – 140
61 Sigmund Freud, “‘Psychoanalysis’ and ‘Libido Theory’” in Sigmund Freud, The Penguin Freud Reader (Penguin, 
2006) p.118
62 But these flickers never quite die away: “each phrase remains pregnant with everything left unsaid” – See Gilles 
Deleuze, Foucault (Continuum, 2006) p.4
63 See Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” (11 Cardozo Law Review 1990) 
p.945 – Hereafter referenced as “Force of Law”
64 See Franz Kafka, The Castle (Penguin Modern Classics, 2007)
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SECTION III: SOME NOTES ON “OF GRAMMATOLOGY”
Of Grammatology (perhaps Derrida’s most famous and widely-read book) picks up where I left off 
in the first section: with the problematic of language/representation.  It begins with an interesting 
observation – namely that the West’s (“that is... the world[s]”65) collective attitude to language has 
always been organized according to a certain sub-categorical hierarchy.  And for Derrida, the 
classic formulation of this hierarchy lives on the first page of Aristotle’s On Interpretation:
“Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of 
spoken words... just as all men have not the same writing so all men have not the same speech 
sounds, but mental experiences, of which these are the primary symbols, are the same for all, 
as are those things of which our experiences are the images…”66
“Mental experiences” (or “affections”67) are the “truths” which are supposed to be packed up and 
delivered by the linguistic postal service, but what about this seeming division between speech and 
writing?  From the outset, we can say that these are (for Aristotle) not simply two ways of doing the 
same thing.  On the one hand, speech – given its “relationship of essential and immediate proximity 
with the mind”68 – is valorized as the “first signifier”69 (“fully present...to itself, to its signified, to 
the other...”70).  On the other hand, writing is seen to threaten this purportedly natural relationship 
between mind and voice because of its:
1. Durability (i.e. temporal extendability) and;
2. Transportability (i.e. spatial extendability).
These attributes create a supposed risk of losing the original signified (i.e. the “true” meaning of the 
author’s thoughts) and, as a result, writing is promptly demoted to the level of a re-representation 
(“the signifier of the signifier”71).
                                               
65 Why the West as “the world”?  As a recognition of Western imperialism/globalization?  Or perhaps to suggest that, 
even if this gesture is a mark of the Western tradition, it is really a means of coping with a difficulty which is universal.  
See “Freud and the Scene of Writing” p.247 for the original quote: “of the West, that is, of the world…”
66 OG, p.30... p.11
67 Depending on the translation of “On Interpretation” – see Sean Gaston, “Introduction” in Gaston & Maclachlan, 
Reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Continuum, 2011) p.xvi
68 OG, p.11
69 ibid
70 ibid, p.8
71 ibid, p.7
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For Derrida, Aristotle’s “phonocentrism”72 (which would become fully endemic throughout the 
West) is caught up in a strange and uncomfortable logic.  To recall section one: language is – by 
definition – an unnatural or artificial technique (“secondariness itself”73 says Bennington) which 
arrives on the scene only to represent “nature” (i.e. that which is “simple, intact [and]… pure”).  
And yet, despite its synthetic/technical character, Aristotle claims that language still has a proper
mode of transmission based on a supposedly “natural unity”74 between the signified and the purely 
phonic signifier.  In other words, language is an unnatural technique nonetheless subject to a 
“natural order”75 of form.
Derrida’s explanation for this strangeness (and for why it has always gone unnoticed) begins with 
the claim that the West’s phonocentric bias stems from a deeper, more fundamental presumption –
namely that of the atomic (i.e. metaphysical) or directly transitory character of language.76  This 
presumption, as Heidegger77 first recognized, is always the presumption of a certain kind of 
presence.  To explain: language can only signify that which exists (whether in tangible or 
conceptual terms) and the idea of existence or “Being” has always been, according to both 
Heidegger and Derrida, conceived of in terms of presence78 – to be “in-the-world” is to have 
presence in it, which is to say that Being is directly equivalent to presence.  In this sense, to borrow 
Derrida’s oft-used phrase, metaphysics can always be described as the “metaphysics of presence”79
– as he says in Writing and Difference: “all the names related to fundamentals… or to the center 
have always designated and invariable presence.”80
This alignment between presence and fundamentality means that nature – as the marker of that 
which is fundamental, primordial, etc. – becomes indelibly linked with presence, to the point where 
nature is nothing but the untouched, pure, “full presence”81 (i.e. existence) of things as they are.  
                                               
72 Derrida’s preferred term for the privileging of speech over writing (which is also roughly interchangeable with the 
term “logocentrism” – the latter placing more emphasis on the privileged position accorded to “mental experience” as 
the source and truth/meaning) – See OG, pp.6 – 26
73 Bennington, p.24
74 Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (Routledge, 1996) p.9 – Hereafter referenced as “Beardsworth”
75 ibid; also see Beardsworth, p.11 for a discussion of this logic in relation to Saussure’s thesis of the “arbitrariness of 
the sign.”
76 This is what Spivak means when she says that “phonocentrism-logocentrism relates to centrism itself – the human 
desire to posit a… beginning and end” – See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” in OG, p.lxviii
77 James M. Giarelli, “On the Metaphysics of Presence” at http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-
Yearbook/2000/giarelli%2000.pdf
78 Isn’t this actually implied semantically?  Think about it: language re-presents, which is to say that it makes present 
again.  Doesn’t this “again” already mark the object of language as a sort of primary presence?
79 For a brief and basic explanation of this term, see Jack Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” (96 The 
Yale Law Journal 1987) p.747
80 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and 
Difference (Routledge, 2001) p.353 – Hereafter referenced as “Structure, Sign and Play”
81 OG, p.73
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In other words, presence is nature.  This is why Aristotle is able to proclaim a nature-of-the-
unnatural without feeling the need to further explain and justify himself – because the bond of 
spatial/temporal presence between mind and voice automatically brings the idea of nature into the 
equation.  To put it simply: it is the “naturalness” of the bond, and not anything within speech itself
(as a secondary technique) which justifies the West’s phonocentrism, which is to say that language 
can (at least by the logic of “Being as presence”82) be an unnatural practice which is internally 
regulated by a natural order.
So: this is where the Grammatology begins, by suggesting two things:
1. Western discourse ceaselessly privileges speech over writing;
2. This privilege pivots on an underlying (and essential) metaphysical presupposition – namely the 
presupposition of the irreducible (and fully present) kernel.
The question then, is where the Grammatology moves from these theoretical/historical 
observations.  I have already suggested that Derrida distrusts the central presumptions of 
language/metaphysics, and that he therefore sees injustice in the West’s cross-board depreciation of 
the written word.  But the question remains as to where this distrust comes from? Out of what 
argument/method?  The next three sections will attempt to articulate an answer.
                                               
82 “Structure, Sign and Play” p.353
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SECTION IV: “THE QUESTION OF THE BOOK”83
In section one, I suggested that the “aporia of the beginning” is also at the beginning (i.e. at the 
“heart”) of Derrida’s work.  In this section, I want to try and back up this claim by making another, 
interlinked claim, namely that the Grammatology – taken as a whole, and considered in terms of a 
certain relationship between its style and its logic – can be understood as an intricate metaphor for 
Derrida’s aporia.  There are several reasons for making this claim:
1. As suggested, the word “aporia” is used somewhat scarcely in Derrida’s early work, and 
demonstrating its concealed centrality in a text like the Grammatology will, I think, serve to 
back up my theory of a mystical but constant “spirit” of deconstruction which ties together the 
focally distinguishable “turns” of Derrida’s philosophy.
2. Seeing the Grammatology as a book with a broad/overarching purpose can help us to find a 
deeper, more contextual understanding of its strategies and arguments.  This will be of 
particular relevance in the next section, where I will be taking a more focused look at the 
Grammatology’s second chapter (“Linguistics and Grammatology”84).
Keeping these reasons in mind, let us proceed – starting with one of the most persistent and 
revealing symbols at work in the Grammatology: the “idea of the book.”85  For Derrida, this is 
closely linked to the aforementioned idea of the postal principle, relying on an “essentially 
theological conception of the book”86 (e.g. the Bible) as something which tells “the truth about 
things”87 in a grand, over-arching sense.  Of course, few books are as self-assured or englobing as 
the Bible, but for Derrida, this is merely a matter of degree since (as per section one) language 
always presumes its own ability to reference something true/prior; to invoke a supervisory signified 
from which the text is inseparable.  So when Derrida says – in Positions – that the Grammatology is 
primarily aimed at questioning the “unity of the book”88 he means that it is aimed at questioning the 
metaphysical presuppositions of language (i.e. the postal principle, the transcendental 
signified, etc.)
                                               
83 Reference to “Jabes and the Question”
84 OG, pp.27 – 73
85 Ian Maclachlan, “The Idea of the Book” in Gaston & Maclachlan, Reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Continuum, 
2011) p.32
86 ibid, p.34
87 Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing” in New Literary History (Vol.10, No.1, Autumn, 39:1978) p.146 –
Hereafter referenced as “Rorty”
88 See Positions, p.3
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However – and this is where we get caught back up in the aporia of the beginning – Derrida’s rail 
against the self-certainty of the book leaves the Grammatology stranded in what we might call a 
self-imposed identity crisis.89  On the one hand, since it argues against the possibility of the book 
(i.e. the possibility of metaphysical fulfillment) the Grammatology seems to demand a fresh label
for itself – something other than the term “book.”90  On the other hand, as Christopher Norris 
remarks, the Grammatology still “looks and reads very much like a book... [arguing] its way with a 
notably book-like persistence and fixity of purpose.”91  Perhaps a few examples are in order to 
clarify Norris’ claim:
1. The phrase “irreducible kernel” – my go-to phrase for explaining the major metaphysical 
assumption behind language – is actually a quote from the Grammatology: “and that... [i.e. 
secondariness]... is the only irreducible kernel [my emphasis] of the concept of writing.”92  
Although Derrida’s “critique”93 of metaphysics (i.e. “bookishness”) goes against the idea that 
signs are linked to irreducible kernels of sense, this quote seems to find Derrida doubling back 
on himself by attributing just such a “kernel”94 to the concept of writing.
2. Although the Grammatology argues (in a very Nietzschean way) that there is no truth as such 
beyond subjective determination, it could be seen to betray this argument by positing a 
somewhat Hegelian/totalizing version of Western history: a single, sweeping narrative which 
explains the movement of the social world according to the operation of a certain philosophical 
idea-cluster – the metaphysics of presence.  In other words, Derrida proposes a particular, 
definitive, unified history while arguing (wholeheartedly) against the very possibility of such a 
history.
                                               
89“…the sign becomes… a volatile object unsure of its vocation” – See Beardsworth, p.7
90 Derrida frequently opted for terms like “text” or “essay” (for example: “...one can take Of Grammatology as a long 
essay...” – Positions, p.4) – the usefulness of which, I think, comes down to their academic connotations.  First of all, 
academic texts or essays are always marginal contributions to much larger (and ultimately endless) fields of study. 
Second of all, academic works back up their arguments by referencing other texts – by referring to other instances of 
language-use rather than always trying to present their own self-standing truth.  Of course, academic texts are never 
any more free from the performative truth-claims of language than any other form of language-use, but the implications 
to which they are connected do serve as expedient metaphors for certain ideas which lie beyond the conventional reach
of language (i.e. as the “language of Western metaphysics” – Positions, p.18)
91 Norris, pp.63 – 64
92 OG, p.44
93 I have emphasized the word “critique” because Derrida was always keen to distance himself from it (even though it 
does, I think, describe one aspect of Derrida’s bearing upon the metaphysical tradition) – See, for example, “Letter to a 
Japanese Friend” p.3 – “deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique…”
94 However, elsewhere, Derrida has used the word “kernel” as I use it here: to denote the true, fixed, stable meaning 
which language assumes without ever quite capturing.  See Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other (Schocken Books, 
1985) p.115
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The question then, is whether these moments of apparent self-effacement are cracks in Derrida’s 
argument, or whether they are somehow part of it.  And the answer, for me, is the latter.  To 
explain: the aporia of the beginning asserts that language is both necessary and insufficient, which 
means that the only way to propose the insufficiency of language (i.e. to question the self-evidence 
of metaphysical norms) is to do so – necessarily – in the very language which our proposal puts into 
question.95  In Writing and Difference, Derrida occasionally filters this difficulty through the 
symbolism of the book, noting how:
“only in the book, coming back to it unceasingly, drawing all our resources from it, could we 
indefinitely designate the writing beyond the book”96 and;
“every exit from the book is made in the book.”97
Since the book (i.e. language/metaphysics) is the unshakeable condition of our existence, Derrida’s 
own theory could not – if it is to be consistent with its own terms – hope to avoid the performative 
assumptions which are tied to the book.  And this means that, rather than being inconsistencies 
within an otherwise relentless storm of anti-metaphysical criticism, Derrida’s occasionally 
totalizing and “bookish” language can actually be seen to support the general thrust of his aporetic 
argument, reminding us that Derrida is not simply “against” metaphysics, but with it too, alongside 
it in its sheer necessity (“both with and against”98 says Caputo).  And in this light, Derrida’s now-
signature phrase, “there is nothing outside the text” shines all the more clearly – there is no referent, 
but neither is there a way to say this without assuming one.99  In other words, to be is always “to-
be-in-the-book.”100
                                               
95 This is the major thrust of Derrida’s infamous criticism of Foucault’s project in his book, Madness and Civilization.  
For Derrida, Foucault errs in believing that he can analyze the language of metaphysics (which Foucault calls the 
“language of reason”) from a point of externality (i.e. of scientific disinterest) since – in Derrida’s view – we can never 
crack into a realm beyond that of our inherited language.  Instead, we have to work within it, even when faced with the 
urge to try and disregard it or write it off.  See Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness” in Jacques 
Derrida, Writing and Difference (Routledge, 2001) pp.36 – 76
96 Jacques Derrida, “Ellipsis” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Routledge, 2001) p.371
97 “Jabes and the Question” p.92
98 Radical Hermeneutics, p.121
99 This is why (as I said in my introduction) an accurate definition of deconstruction will simultaneously posit and 
refuse itself.  Perhaps the most important aspect of this section is that it makes this explicit for the first time in my 
argument.
100 “Jabes and the Question” p.93 – There’s also a very interesting (and strikingly similar) quote from Jabes on this 
page: “the world exists because the book exists…”
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SECTION V: PURE INTERPRETATION
Two Saussures:
So: I have argued that the Grammatology – taken as a somewhat synthetic whole – can be viewed 
as an effort to expose the aporetic quality (i.e. as per my “aporia of the beginning”) of our 
existence-in-language.  In light of this claim, we must now ask how Derrida instigates this 
exposure; by what method, in what style, etc.  The short answer (the one which I will be fleshing 
out over the course of this section) is that the Grammatology proceeds interpretively; by 
meticulously re-reading a number of texts which Derrida deems exemplary of the Western (i.e. 
phono-centric/metaphysical) tradition, and by doing so through a particular lens – a deconstructive 
“text-view”101 we might say – which is beautifully summed up on the first page of Spivak’s 
preface to the Grammatology:
“Jacques Derrida is maitre-assistant in philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure… 
Jacques Derrida is also this [Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, etc.] collection of 
texts…”102
This isn’t a fresh observation from Spivak, but rather her attempt to take on a certain element of 
Derrida’s voice; to speak for him and his text-view.  To explain: for Derrida, there are always two –
two Platos, two Rousseaus, two Saussures, etc.  The first (i.e. the individual) bears the burden of the 
“entire uncritical tradition which he inherits”103 – of the personal, ideological limits which fence-in 
and disable the potentiality of his discourse.  The second, on the other hand, defies these limitations.  
As Plato suggested, writing (i.e. a “collection of texts”) is endowed with the ability to slip free of its 
author’s grasp.104  This doesn’t just mean freedom from the author’s paternal wisdom, but also from 
their numerous defects, including the “ideological blinders”105 (i.e. “metaphysical 
presuppositions”106) which stunt their intellectual growth.  And in this sense, the de-individualized 
text is charged with critical potential; ready to turn against its author’s intentions and 
understandings at any moment.
                                               
101 Which must scrupulously distinguished (as I have stressed) from deconstruction itself.  See Gasche, pp.121 – 176
102 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” in OG, p.ix
103 OG, p.46
104 See Plato, Phaedrus (Oxford University Press, 2009)
105 See Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing, Etc. (Harvard University Press, 1993) p.220 
106 Positions, p.31
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So when, for example, Derrida reads Saussure’s Course on General Linguistics – in chapter two of 
the Grammatology107 – it is only ever with an eye for this duplicity; for this “tension between 
gesture and statement”108 (i.e. between Saussure and Saussure109).  On the one hand, according to 
Derrida, Saussure’s text plays an “absolutely decisive critical role”110 – investing in theses which 
seem to de-privilege the core values (e.g. presence/unity) of the metaphysical enterprise.  On the 
other hand, the Course remains inhabited by a plethora of logo/phono-centric “truths” which 
overhang and de-radicalize Saussure’s most explosive discoveries.  To understand how this works 
(and to see how Derrida’s “deconstructive” reading is always the “vigilant practice of this [gesture 
vs. statement] textual division”111) let us now take a closer look at each of Derrida’s two Saussures.
                                               
107 See Jacques Derrida, “Linguistics and Grammatology” in OG, pp.27 – 73
108 An explanatory note is necessary here to clarify what Derrida means by “gesture” and “statement.”  First of all, 
deducing the “gesture” of a text means asking the following questions: what effect do the words on the page actually
have?; what logical pathways do they open/close?; what type of potential do the words carry if they are received with an 
“open mind”?  Second of all, deducing the “statement” of a text means asking what the text claims it is doing – i.e. what 
the author’s declared intentions and objectives appear to be – see OG, p.30
109 Or (to borrow Paul de Man’s phrase) between “blindness and insight” – See Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1983)
110 Positions, p.18
111 ibid, p.31
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Saussure #1:
“Saussure: ‘Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole 
purpose of representing the first.’”112
And so, in Saussure, the Aristotelian formula repeats itself – writing as a “particular, derivative, 
auxiliary form of language in general.”113  In fact, does Saussure not go further?  If we take him at 
his word, writing isn’t even a “form” of language, but a stand-in; a cheap substitute that we can call 
upon in the absence of language (which has a “definite and [far more] stable oral tradition that is 
independent of writing”114).  In other words, writing is sub-language (“not a guise for language but 
a disguise… a garment of perversion and debauchery”115) while speech – given that the exorcism of 
writing is so clean, so total – becomes nothing less than language in its entirety.
“Why?” asks Derrida.  Why is writing so readily and totally dismissed?  Moreover: why the “rabid 
tone”116 – the “strain of rhetorical excess”117 (that which is perhaps most evident in Saussure’s 
vilification of the “tyranny of writing”118)?  “The tone counts”119 says Derrida:
“...it is as if, at the moment when the modern science of the logos would come into its 
autonomy and its scientificity, it became necessary again to attack a heresy…”120
These tonal discrepancies (“discursive inequalities”121 to quote Gasche) have traditionally been 
excluded “from the canon of philosophical themes.”122  The philosopher (in the most classic sense) 
is supposed to bracket-off flurries of literary surplus, whittling the text down to its bones: a series of 
straightforward propositions listed in the “sparse, pure, transparent language”123 of deductive
logic.124  But if it were possible to simply “whittle” away all but the disinterest of science, why 
would Saussure – a social scientist no less – not have done this himself?  
                                               
112 OG, p.30
113 ibid, p.7
114 ibid, p.41 (Quoting Saussure – my emphasis on “independent”)
115 ibid, p.35 (Quoting Saussure)
116 J. Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction (University of Minnesota Press, 1991) p.160
117 Christopher Norris, Derrida (Fontana Press, 1987) p.88
118 OG, p.38 (Quoting Saussure)
119 ibid, p.34
120 ibid
121 Gasche, pp.124 – 136
122 ibid, p.135
123 Richard Rorty, “Deconstruction and Circumvention” in Critical Inquiry (Vol.11, No.1, Sep 1984) p.2
124 In other words, philosophical discourse is prone to selective blindness – the only discrepancies for which it can 
account are those which could be termed “logical” in the most traditional terms.
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It would be understandable if Saussure was merely prone to lapses in scientific equity, but he goes 
much further, at times even slipping into the “accent of the moralist or preacher.”125  The question 
lingers – why?
Derrida’s answer, nodding to Freud, is that Saussure’s disjointing moralism can be explained as his 
attempt to deal with the “return of the repressed”126 figure of writing.  To explain: writing is (as I 
have suggested already) repressed/devalued on the basis of its durability and transportability –
factors which threaten to disconnect words from the “mental affections” which they are meant to 
represent.  However, since writing and speech are so indelibly127 and basically linked, speech can 
never be fully insulated against this threat of disconnection, and as a result, has to keep reasserting 
itself against the “haunting”128 afterglow of writing.129  And for Derrida, the driving force of this 
reassertion is Saussure’s own very “basic” and very human “desire... [for] reassuring certitude”130 –
for the comfort of being in control of one’s existence.131  This is why Saussure’s rhetoric is so 
strained and over-the-top: because he is desperately trying to satisfy a (dare I say) fundamental life-
drive.
                                               
125 OG, p.34
126 Sigmund Freud, “Repression” at http://files.meetup.com/382157/Freud%20-%20Repression%20(1915).pdf – p.2984
127 By which I mean that they are always linked by their shared status as representative techniques – even if we 
distinguish their properly represented objects, as Aristotle does: “spoken words are the symbols of mental experience 
and written words are the symbols of spoken words” and as Saussure repeats: “language and writing are two distinct 
systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first…”
128 In Specters of Marx, Derrida talks about the possibility of a “hauntology” which would exceed ontology (noting the 
inaudible play between these words).  This links in with our current discussion of the “return of the repressed” because 
Derrida suggests that this hauntology – this science of ghosts – would entail a “step beyond” repression, which is to say 
that the logic of the ghost is (for Derrida) precisely that which exceeds metaphysics.  See Jacques Derrida, Specters of 
Marx (Routledge, 1994) p.26 – Hereafter referenced as “Specters of Marx”
129 As Derrida says in “Freud and the Scene of Writing” – repression isn’t expulsion or exclusion, but interior 
containment.  In other words, the repressed is always “on the scene” and requires a continual exertion of force against it 
for the repression to remain effective – see “Freud and the Scene of Writing” pp.246 – 247
130 “Structure, Sign and Play” p.352
131 I think of this as a rough fusion of Nietzsche’s “will-to-power” and Freud’s “pleasure principle” – one which would 
roughly entail a need to construct “truths” (i.e. to control one’s surroundings – a la Nietzsche) as a way of avoiding the 
abyssal anguish of senselessness (i.e. to avoid pain/displeasure, a la Freud).
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Saussure #2:
“in language there are only differences without positive terms”132
“language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only 
conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system”133
“The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that 
surround it”134
For Derrida, the above quotes signal the point where we really “have to oppose Saussure to 
himself”135 – specifically in the sense that his marking of “difference as the source of linguistic 
value”136 directly undercuts the central presupposition of the West’s phonocentrism: that of a 
meaning which is “present in and of itself.”137  To explain: “difference is never in itself a sensible 
plenitude”138 but the no-man’s land between two sites of supposedly self-contained identity – i.e. 
two kernels.  The trouble is, if we accord privileged status to this no-man’s land rather than the sites 
themselves  (as Saussure does) then the sites will no longer be self-contained (i.e. since they depend 
on something other than themselves) but parasitic, always, upon the other terms within the system.  
And just like that – in one fell, theoretical swoop – language becomes an introverted network of
bloodsuckers, while meaning (the “naked presence of the thing itself”139) becomes a pipe dream, 
lost in a “mirror-play of signifiers.”140
This is the real tension of the Course: on the one hand, speech (i.e. language itself, according to 
Saussure #1) is granted priority over writing (“the signifier of [a] signifier”141); on the other hand, 
language (as a network of differential relations) is impliedly reduced to a “tissue of signifiers”142 – a 
representative-sans-referent, just like writing.143  This provides us with fresh layer of explanation 
for Saussure’s seemingly strained tone – namely that the fulfillment of his metaphysical desire for 
                                               
132 Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (The Harvester Press, 1982) p.11 
(Quoting Saussure) – Hereafter referenced as “Différance”
133 ibid
134 ibid
135 OG, p.52
136 ibid
137 “Différance” p.11
138 OG, p.53
139 Radical Hermeneutics, p.191
140 ibid, p.187
141 OG, p.7
142 Radical Hermeneutics, p.133
143 “...‘signifier of the signifier’ no longer defines the accidental doubling and fallen secondarity... [but] the movement 
of language: in its origin” (OG, p.7)
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fixity and truth now requires him to overcome the debilitating and self-defeating potentiality of his 
own logic.  Rather than tackling it head on, Saussure tries to avoid this logic by pleading ignorance; 
by closing his eyes144 to its more uncomfortable (i.e. counter-metaphysical) implications.145  But for 
Derrida, this achieves nothing: once its potentiality is out of the box, there is no way to put it back 
in (i.e. no way to unsay the said or un-imply the implied).
Derrida’s next move is to follow this previously undeveloped logic – to try and release it from 
Saussure’s repressive disinterest by speaking for it, by putting some much needed flesh on its 
bones.  However, this development is not – and Derrida was always quick to emphasize this point –
some sort of textual psychoanalysis whereby the “repressed” logic of the text is exposed as its 
underlying “truth”146 (which would, by definition, be just another kernel – albeit a well-hidden one).  
Nor is it one move towards some sort of dialectical (i.e. Hegelian) reconciliation whereby the 
metaphysical and critical poles of the text could be sublated to reveal a simple, unified, true 
meaning prior to their division.147  Quite the opposite: Derrida’s approach is to try and shun the 
metaphysical desire for unity (i.e. the very desire which he claims to have blinded Saussure) by 
affirming and suspending the contradictions and inconsistencies of the text through – as noted in the 
introduction to this section – a “vigilant practice of... textual division.”148  We need to take a closer 
look at what this means in the next section, but first, let us briefly recount (as matter of 
clarification) the more insistent features of Derrida’s reading.
                                               
144 Hence Paul de Man’s phrase, “blindness and insight” – See Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983)
145 I will provide a brief explanation of what this means (i.e. of how Saussure closes his eyes) in the next section.
146 See “Freud and the Scene of Writing” pp.246 – 247
147 See Positions, p.41 – “[deconstruction] must sign the point at which one breaks with the system of the Aufhebung
and... speculative dialectics”
148 Positions, p.31 – a phrase which we could then translate as something like this: the investigation, explanation, and 
maintenance of textual division...
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“At a point of almost absolute proximity to Hegel...”149:
“To understand Derrida, one must see his work as the latest development in [a] non-Kantian, 
dialectical tradition”150
Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing” 
Although I have claimed that Derrida’s work is directly opposed to Hegelian dialectics, Rorty’s 
suggestion (i.e. that Derrida belongs to a certain “dialectical tradition”) can still make sense –
perhaps even in a way which will deepen (or at least focus) our understanding of deconstruction.  
To explain: Derrida’s philosophy (to make a purely expedient assertion) comprises two discrete 
phases: a first, dialectical, and a second, non-dialectical.  The first phase covers the adoption and 
application of Derrida’s bipartite text-view, and a consideration of why this text-view is 
“dialectical” will serve the additional function of better acquainting us with its more 
operative/insistent features.  Consider the following:
1.  According to Rorty, Derrida’s work is dialectical because it falls within a particular “tradition 
of... thinking that begins with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”151 and weaves its way to Derrida 
via Heidegger.  This tradition shuns the Kantian quest for “veridicality and world-disclosure”152 in 
favour of an ongoing (indeed, “interminable”153) process of reinterpretation which seeks to evaluate 
the texts of “a certain sequence of historical figures”154 (Plato, Aristotle, etc.) in terms of their 
argumentative rigour and coherence – not their representative accuracy (i.e. their connection to an 
extra-textual “reality”155).
                                               
149 Positions, p.40
150 Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing” (39 New Literary History 2008) p.104 – Hereafter referenced as 
“Rorty”
151 Simon Critchley, “Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?” in Simon 
Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity (Verso, 1999) p.91
152 ibid
153 Positions, p.39
154 Rorty, p.103
155 Hegel and Derrida, I believe, can also be linked by their tendency to view the texts they read as part of a meta-
narrative whereby philosophy “works itself pure” (to borrow Dworkin’s phrase – Law’s Empire [Hart, 1998] p.400).  
For Hegel, philosophy is always oscillating, projecting itself gradually, dialectically, towards a particular teleological 
endpoint.  But for Derrida, there is no discernible endpoint – no grand scheme according to which we can make sense of 
philosophical history.  This doesn’t mean that the phrase “works itself pure” is inapplicable to Derrida, but that for him, 
the word “pure” should be supplemented by something else – “free” perhaps.  There is no purity as a point of finality 
and fulfillment, but there is a certain unending path to purity which must be negotiated by constantly wrestling 
discourse “free” from its ideological inhibitors (Derrida’s work being the latest attempt to move beyond the inhibitions 
of previous visionaries – Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, etc.); Derrida: “the time for overturning is never a dead letter” –
Positions, p.39
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In this sense, Derrida’s work could be aptly described as pure156 interpretation: a mode of reading 
which never transcends the text “toward something other than it, toward [a] referent”157 or a static 
signified.  Even when Derrida makes arguments which seem to be about “reality” – about truth, 
nature, and “things” (i.e. “transcendental”158 arguments) – they are never actually his159 arguments, 
but incarnations of the “unexploited possibilities”160 of a given text.  This means that the purity of 
Derrida’s interpretation comes from its depth; from its willingness to treat the text not just as a 
sequence of words, but as an electric cocktail of multi-directional logics.  And when we understand 
this aspect of his interpretive lens, we can also understand why Derrida would claim that 
deconstruction never depends on any sort of subjective movement or decision: because it is 
happening – already and always – within the text itself.161
2.  For many theorists (e.g. Bertell Ollman162 or Paul Diesing163 or Howard Sherman164) the 
definitive aspect of dialectical thinking lies in its commitment to viewing objects, at any point in 
time, as moments within a continuous process of interaction between opposing forces.  For 
example, when Hegel looked at a particular period of social history (e.g. the “Greek World”165) he 
saw it as a snapshot of an ongoing tug-of-war “between private interest and communal values”166 –
not a simple back and forth, but a sort of pulsating ascent; a movement of “mutual learning and 
reconciliation”167 through which society gradually moves beyond its deficiencies to a point where 
private autonomy (i.e. freedom of conscience) and communal values fall perfectly in sync.
                                               
156 My use of the word “pure” is influenced by the opening interview in Asif Kapadia’s documentary, Senna.  Kapadia’s 
subject (Brazilian racing driver, Ayrton Senna) describes his early experiences of racing go-karts as “pure racing” – free 
from politics, from economics, from greed, etc.  Of course, Derrida is suspicious of the idea of such insulated purity 
(i.e. since it is so firmly metaphysical) – hence my decision to place it “under erasure.”  However, I find it a useful term 
provided it is taken a certain way: not as a marker of some Godly ability to avoid the direct reference, but as a marker 
of Derrida’s deliberate decision to try – as far as possible – to read texts on their own terms, not in terms of some 
transcendental referent.
157 Rorty, p.106 (Quoting Derrida’s Grammatology)
158 To borrow a key phrase from Geoffrey Bennington, Derrida never makes transcendental arguments, only “quasi-
transcendental” ones which comment on the futility of transcendental arguments.  In Socratic terms, we might say that 
Derrida is trying to explain why we know nothing, rather than trying (hopelessly) to know anything.  I shall explain this 
point later – See Bennington, p.267
159 As Rorty says, Derrida does “not have arguments or theses” – See Rorty, p.103
160 Gasche, p.136
161 “Deconstruction is never the effect of a subjective act or desire” – Gasche, p.123
162 “Dialectics is… a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of… interactions that occur in the world” –
Bertell Ollman, Dialectical Investigations (Routledge, 1993) p.10
163 “...dialectic is a continuing process of interaction between two opposites” – Paul Diesing, Hegel’s Dialectical 
Political Economy (Westview Press, 1999) p.29
164 “...dialectics means an approach to problems that visualizes the world as an interconnected totality undergoing minor 
and major changes due to internal conflicts of opposing forces” – Howard Sherman, “Dialectics as a Method” in  
Insurgent Sociologist (Summer, 1976) p.57
165 See Peter Singer, Hegel (Oxford University Press, 1983) chapter 1
166 ibid, p.45
167 Paul Diesing, Hegel’s Dialectical Political Economy (Westview Press, 1999) p.30
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This aspect of dialectical theory (excepting the metaphysical idea of everything falling “perfectly in 
sync”) is, I think, applicable to Derrida in two ways.  The first is obvious: Derrida is a “dialectical” 
reader simply because he thinks of the text in terms of opposing forces – two Saussures, 
“metaphysical presuppositions... [and] critical motifs”168 etc.  But as I suggested, Derrida’s reading 
resists the urge to reconcile these forces, to raise them up towards a single, “true” meaning of the 
text – the textual equivalent of the end of Hegel’s history.  In this sense (and this is the second way) 
Derrida’s “double”169 reading can be seen as a sort of “negative dialectic... whose point is to give no 
comfort”170 so much as to affirm, as Nietzsche did, the chaotic senselessness which prevails beyond 
the comfort of metaphysics.  And to reiterate my earlier point, it is this – this senseless, non-
metaphysical “foreignness” – which animates and drives Derrida’s entire project.
                                               
168 Positions, p.31
169 Or “clotural” reading as Simon Critchley calls it – See Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Blackwell, 
1992) pp.88 – 97
170 Radical Hermeneutics, p.198
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Derrida vs. Hegel – The Break:
Now: the method of pure/deep interpretation which I have located in Derrida’s reading of Saussure 
remains constant, which is to say that it doesn’t suddenly give way to some radically divergent 
substitute which would usher in the second, non-dialectical phase of deconstruction. Rather, 
Derrida uses this same method – this tentative, meticulous way of “following… the unstable 
limit… of a text”171 – to drive directly against Hegel’s ambitiously comprehensive “system of the 
Aufhebung” and to offer up his own “quasi-transcendental” system (which is really a non-system; a 
system-against-“systematicity”172) in its place.  We might say then, that Derrida’s debt to Hegel 
(vast as it may be) is heavily qualified, and that my emphasis upon this debt – while expedient in its 
underlining of the divisive, intra-textual characteristics of the deconstructive text-view – should be 
taken with a grain of salt.
In my chapter plan, I claimed that Derrida is always trying to tap into a certain “counter-
metaphysical foreignness” – something in excess of the inescapable(?) order of metaphysics.  
Hegel, on the other hand, is more interested in finding ways to systematize and purify all
manifestations of supposed foreignness (i.e. to “de-foreignize”173 them) by folding every other into 
the “reassuring certitude”174 of the same.  In other words, Derrida’s break with Hegel is inscribed, 
from the start, in his deliberate and project-defining break with the so-called metaphysics of 
presence.175  And this means that it is not the break which we have to account for in the next 
section, but how Derrida uses his quasi-dialectical text-view (i.e. method) to account for and 
conceptualize that which lies beyond the break; beyond the metaphysics of repression.
                                               
171 A fuller version of this quote is useful here since it provides a concise summary of Derrida’s interpretive approach: 
“Derrida reads with two hands, following assiduously and indefatigably the unstable limit that divides what we might 
call the logic of a text… from the intentions that attempt to govern that text, the author-ity that tries to dissolve or 
control [its] aporias” – See Simon Critchley, “On Derrida’s Spectres of Marx” in Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics-
Subjectivity (Verso, 1999) p.145
172 Rodolphe Gasche, “Infrastructures and Systematicity” in John Sallis, Deconstruction and Philosophy (University of 
Chicago Press, 1987) p.3
173 See Gasche, pp.35 – 59
174 See Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Jacques Derrida, Writing 
and Difference (Routledge, 2001) p.352
175 It might be useful here to think about Hegel in terms of Simon Critchley’s description of his philosophy as a 
“discourse on and of the end.”  If we say that Derrida begins by questioning the possibility of the justifiable beginning 
(let alone the justifiable end of Hegelianism) then doesn’t a certain chasmic, motivational gap between Derrida and 
Hegel become clear?  Hegel wants to find an end, while Derrida – by preaching the necessity of a perpetual beginning –
wants to declare the impossibility of such an end.  See Simon Critchley, “On Derrida’s Spectres of Marx” in Simon 
Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity (Verso, 1999) p.150
30
SECTION VI: DIFFÉRANCE (AND THE “INFRASTRUCTURAL CHAIN”…)
In this section, I want to tie up a number of loose ends in my argument.  Firstly, I have been 
delaying (since section one) in giving a much needed account of why Derrida adopts his 
Nietzschean belief in the futility of objective reference – the belief which completes and animates 
my aporia of the beginning; which makes it an aporia as such insofar as it thwarts/frustrates the 
fundamental goal of language (i.e. inter-subjective connection/understanding).  Secondly, I have
raised the question, through my comments on the last few pages, of how Derrida manages to do 
anything positive (i.e. any sort of substantive “work”) while staving off the Hegelian “temptation to 
liquidate negativity and difference”176 – specifically in the sense that such liquidation seems to be 
the only substantive way of dealing with contradiction.  And thirdly, I still need to follow Derrida’s 
reading of Saussure to its conclusion: to the full and radical liberation (and as Caputo puts it, 
deconstruction is “always performed in the name of liberation”177) of Saussure’s critical logic.
These points can, I think, be adequately addressed through an exposition of “différance”178 – one of 
the most renowned and enduring179 concepts to emerge out of Derrida’s early texts. But first, I 
want to pre-orient this exposition by noting a certain double relation between différance and my 
aporia of the beginning – the lynchpin of Derrida’s theoretical landscape as I have depicted it thus 
far.  In one sense, différance and the aporia of the beginning are directly equivalent: they are both 
ways of describing what I have called “counter-metaphysical foreignness” (which is to say that they 
both name a certain condition of disunity and suspense; a logic which exceeds the borders of 
classical, philosophical logic).  But in another sense, the aporia of the beginning is but a hypothesis 
to a more intricate thesis of différance; a rudimentary blueprint for its comprehensive system (a 
“system beyond Being”180 as Gasche puts it).  In other words, différance presupposes and then 
accounts for my initial aporia.  Keeping this duality in mind, let us now move to consider the 
“meaning” of différance, point-by-point.
                                               
176 Gasche, p.154
177 Radical Hermeneutics, p.192
178 The meaning of which is concisely summarized in Positions, pp.7 – 11 
179 Indeed, Derrida never stopped using the term “différance” – it continues to make frequent appearances as late as in 
the posthumously published seminar series, The Beast and the Sovereign.  See Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the 
Sovereign: Volume I (University of Chicago Press, 2009)
180 Gasche, p.178
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What is différance?
It is not Derrida’s:  This first point stems directly from what I said in the last section.  On the one 
hand, there can be no disagreement that différance is a Derridean neologism, which is to say that 
both the graphic imprint (and I say graphic rather than phonic since the shift from difference to 
différance is inaudible181; a “mute mark... [or] a tacit monument”182 says Derrida) and its 
attachment to certain philosophical implications were born (chronologically speaking) with Derrida.  
But on the other hand, this neologistic connection between Derrida and différance is only a matter 
of his naming what was previously unnamed183 (i.e. the discontinued/repressed potentiality of the 
text).  Remember: deconstructive interpretation is pure/deep interpretation, which means that 
Derrida’s seemingly original concepts are never his, but those which are discovered unknowingly or 
accidentally by other writers.184  And différance – even as it has become so readily identifiable with 
Derrida – has just such a heritage: it is (in loose terms) a heterogeneous “condensation of 
Nietzschean, Saussurian, Freudian, Levinasian, and Heideggerian (even Hegelian)”185
conceptualizations of difference; a condensation which is “all the more interesting in that it does not 
claim exhaustively to capture each of these”186 variations.
It is spacing/temporization:  Rather than providing a lengthy and extensive breakdown of these 
lines, I want to focus specifically on how différance is developed (or perhaps merely “read”) from 
“Saussure’s principle of semiological difference.”187  As we have seen, this principle holds that “the 
idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance”188 than “the spacing by means of
which... [signs] are related to each other.”189  For Derrida, this thesis cannot – logically speaking –
avoid complicity with a second movement, one which is temporal rather than spatial and which 
undermines Saussure’s dogmatic retention of identity (i.e. “calm, present, and self-referential 
                                               
181 Note the significance of this with regard to Derrida’s angle in the Grammatology – doesn’t the possibility of 
inaudible shifts undermine the total, pure, unequivocal privilege accorded to speech over writing? 
182 “Différance” p.4
183 As Derrida puts it, he lets it “impose itself... [upon him] in its neographism” – See “Différance” p.3
184 Indeed, deconstruction itself was born in this manner, emerging (specifically) as a radical interweaving and 
development of Husserl’s “abbau” and Heidegger’s “destruktion” (amongst others) – See Gasche, pp.109 – 120
185 David Wood & Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and Différance (Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.xi
186 ibid
187 Robert Bernasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida” in Wood & Bernasconi, Derrida and Difference 
(Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.13 (Quoting Derrida) – Additional Note:  There are three reasons for my 
decision to focus solely on Saussure.  Firstly: we have already dealt with his theory (and Derrida’s reading of it) and so 
need no further introduction to it.  Secondly: Derrida often begins explanations of différance via Saussure – perhaps 
because he feels it to be a more relatable and understandable point of entry than many others (see, for example, 
“Différance” or Positions).  And thirdly: it would be difficult (given the limited space available) to summarize the 
relationship between différance and, for example, Heidegger’s ontic-ontological difference, without slipping into 
destructive/reductive oversimplification. 
188 “Différance” p.11 (Quoting Saussure)
189 Positions, p.24
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unity”190) as merely “less important” than difference.  To explain: if each sign functions only by 
referring to and distinguishing itself from other signs, then signification can only ever be a way of 
navigating intra-systematically – of diverting us through a “chain of... substitutions”191 or 
signifiers.192 This means that the quest for a pre-existent, pre-systematic reality (i.e. the quest of 
language) is always postponed, “temporized”193 or deferred, and it is precisely this movement (this 
“detour... [or] relay”194) which is imposed upon Saussure’s intended thesis by the “a” of différance
– thereby setting us up to define Derrida’s coinage loosely as a “nonunitary synthesis”195
comprising and co-implicating the supposedly heterogeneous concepts of spacing and 
temporization/difference and deferral.196
It “would not merely be opposed to identity”197:  Although différance is – at least in one of its 
guises – a radicalization of Saussurian difference, this doesn’t mean that it is simply the inversion of 
the conventional relationship between identity and difference, and it doesn’t mean that it is simply 
the setting up of one side of Saussure’s text (i.e. the counter-metaphysical one) as “truer” than the 
other.  On the first point, since différance is posited as the logic of the semiotic system, and since 
this logic heralds the purely intra-systematic wiring of the system, it must follow that all 
concepts/expressions – including identity, difference, and the binary opposition of the two – are 
merely “determination[s] or... effect[s]”198 of différance, which is to say that différance not only 
produces identities, but also differences and even the concept of difference itself.  On the second 
point, the radical logic of Saussure’s text is only privileged to the extent that it seems to “account 
for the heterogeneity”199 of the Course, and this means that it isn’t positioned so much as the “truth”
of the text as it is a way of explaining the appearance and prevalence of its seemingly multiple 
“truths” or logics.  Furthermore, to suggest or affirm the futility of linguistic reference always 
entails, by a paradoxical turn, a simultaneous affirmation of metaphysics and linguistic atomization,
since these ideas are so inseparably entwined with language.  And this means that, even as it is 
strictly derived from one side of Saussure’s text, the logic of différance can still be seen as an
affirmation of both sides – one which elucidates the status of the text as irreparably “cut or torn.”200
                                               
190 “Différance” p.11
191 ibid, p.26
192 “look up the signified of an unknown signifier in the dictionary and you find more signifiers” – Bennington, p.33
193 ibid, p.8
194 ibid
195 Gasche, p.195
196 As Christopher Norris puts it, the difference between Derrida and Saussure lies largely in the extent to which Derrida  
lets differ “shade… into defer” – See Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2003) p.32
197 David Wood & Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and Différance (Northwestern University Press, 1988) p.x
198 “Différance” p.16
199 Gasche, p.135
200 Bennington, p.305
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It is not a “master-word”201:  At this stage, we may be tempted to see différance as a sort of 
“scrambling” device that disrupts the relation between subject and object; between language-user 
and world.  This is a somewhat helpful viewpoint, but it is far from being unqualified.  First of all, it 
would be a mistake to think of différance as solely and thoroughly disruptive, since it is also the 
productive structure which enables signification; which makes it (i.e. basic/practical human 
interaction) possible.  Secondly – and this point cannot be too heavily emphasized – not even the 
subject/object distinction (and this includes the concepts of subject and object taken on their own, 
as self-evident and basic as they may seem) can be “sheltered from... [the] effects”202 of différance, 
which is to say that they cannot be taken as anything other than contingent203 by-products of a 
“systematic play”204 of differences.  Indeed, even différance – in its appearance as a sort of 
epistemological bedrock – is “plunged into what it attempts to name”205 and, in this sense, always 
steals itself away; destroying itself in its coinage and its utterance.  As Derrida puts it: “however 
excellent, unique, principal, or transcendent... [différance] governs nothing, reigns over nothing, 
and nowhere exercises any authority... there is no kingdom of différance…”206
It is the basis of a Socratic/negative epistemology:  This last point on the self-effacing and therefore 
self-dethroning character of différance reveals, I think, a clear link between Derrida and Socrates207
(who Derrida calls “the disturbing man of question and irony”208).209  I say this with a particular 
mind for Socrates’ infamous claim – towards the end of “Book I”210 of Plato’s Republic – that he 
felt his only real knowledge to be of his complete lack of knowledge. The paradox of Socrates’ 
claim (i.e. that to know nothing would underwrite and exclude even the knowledge of this lack) is, 
to my mind, the very same paradox which arises out of Derrida’s non-kingdom or kingdom of 
différance.  To explain: différance names the existential condition which disables epistemology in 
general (i.e. the possibility of objective/unfiltered truth) – and yet, how else can we negate 
epistemology except by making a certain epistemological claim?  This is why deconstruction is an 
                                               
201 ibid, p.79
202 ibid, p.74
203 Which is to say that they have “not fallen from the sky” – See Radical Hermeneutics, p.195
204 “Différance” p.11
205 Bennington, p.73
206 “Différance” p.22
207 Although perhaps, if we are looking for an ancient Greek precursor to Derrida, Heraclitus (who Caputo refers to as 
the “philosopher of the flux par excellence and a hidden hero for... Derrida” – See Radical Hermeneutics, p.202) is just 
as promising a candidate.  After all, Derrida’s first use of the term “deconstruction” was immediately preceded by and 
equivocated to the term “de-sedimentation” – a term which essentially means allowing debris to be picked up and swept 
away in the river-flow; in the flux.  See OG, p.10
208 Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality (Stanford University Press, 2000) p.13
209 A number of other theorists have affirmed this link.  See, for example, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n21/judith-butler/jacques-derrida (“it is interesting that Derrida the philosopher should find in 
Socrates his proper precursor”); or Radical Hermeneutics, p.195 (“I favor the Socratic analogy when dealing with 
Derrida: the practitioner of disruptive strategies”)
210 Plato, The Republic, at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm#2H_4_0004
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“ongoing, always unfinished work”211 – because its purported foundations (i.e. différance) 
inevitably become ensnared and caught back up in the epistemological/metaphysical movement 
which Derrida is always at pains to “interrupt”212/suspend.  And in this sense, différance is but one 
link “in a chain that in truth it will never have governed.”213
It is “supplementarity”214 et al215:  Gasche refers to this “chain” as infrastructural, and the various 
links and substitutions which it contains and gives rise to are basically recognitions (but not
avoidances) of the metaphysical complicity of even an inverted, self-reflexive epistemology like 
Derrida’s.  What then, are some of the other links in this chain?  One example (which is unlocked 
via Derrida’s scrupulous reading of Rousseau in the Grammatology) is “supplementarity” – another 
“arche”216 concept which plays off the sense in which the word “supplement” lives a double life as 
both an addition/attachment to “something that is already full... in itself”217 and a mode of 
compensation which “fills a void”218 or makes up for a fundamental lack.  Although it is born out of 
an interpretation of Rousseau, the aporetic logic of the supplement can be applied to Saussure and 
his theory of difference in order to show how supplementarity asymmetrically reflects différance, 
thereby serving as an alternative metaphor for the very same condition.  To explain: Saussure’s 
discourse is metaphysically tempered, and it therefore restricts the role of difference to that of a 
supplement in the first sense – an external attachment which is required only to the extent that it 
enables the representation of a fixed, prior meaning.  However – and this point is key – this first, 
metaphysical definition of the supplement cannot be separated or insulated from the second, and 
just as Saussurian difference implies its own radicalization (i.e. différance) so too must a limited, 
“Saussurian” supplementarity imply a more radical system in which each term needs to be 
supplemented by every other (i.e. in which every supplement is itself in need of supplementation) 
so that the quest for a self-standing signified can only take us along a never-ending “chain of 
supplements.”219
                                               
211 Radical Hermeneutics, p.192
212 Positions, p.38
213 “Différance” p.7
214 See OG, pp.141 – 157
215 The “et al” stands for a plethora of other Derridean “infrastructures” such as “arche-trace” – see Arthur Bradley, 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Edinburgh University Press, 2008) pp.69 – 78; and “iterability” – see Jacques Derrida, 
Limited Inc. (Northwestern University Press, 1998) pp.1 – 21
216 Which goes under erasure because (as Derrida says) “what is put into question [by différance] is precisely… the 
value arkhe” – See “Différance” p.6
217 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Edinburgh University Press, 2008) p.102
218 OG, p.145
219 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Edinburgh University Press, 2008) p.105
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It is always “to come”220:  All of this means that a full revelation of the condition named by 
différance must never – by the logic of différance itself – be any closer to us than a speck on the 
horizon, which is to say that it must be perpetually to-come.  So when Derrida writes (in The 
Politics of Friendship) that “the friends of truth are without the truth”221 he is referring (I think) to 
the more thoughtful, tentative practitioners of deconstruction; those who understand that his own, 
limited brand of deconstruction, in its exposure of the pre-metaphysical logic of différance,
positions itself as little more than the methodological servant of a higher end or “spirit” – one which 
exceeds the service of its servant and begs for the most radical and even self-destructive version of 
Socratic inquiry.  Inversely: since this “spirit” is born out of différance, it must also keep its eyes on 
the past, justifying itself (ceaselessly) in the strength of its conceptual birth.  And in this sense, we 
could say that the “spirit” of deconstruction is always caught between two debts: one to its past, and 
one to its future; one to its father (i.e. Derrida and his various conceptualizations) and one to its own 
radical independence (i.e. its inability not to break free; to ruin the “truth” of its own existence).
                                               
220 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (Verso, 2005) p.41 – Hereafter referenced as “The Politics of 
Friendship”
221 ibid, p.43
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CONCLUSION:
I see you coming, you the arrivants to come, you the arrivant thinkers, you the coming, the 
upcoming…the new philosophers, my readers to come, who will be my readers only if you 
become new philosophers – that is, if you know how to read me… if you can think what I write in 
my stead…”222
Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship
So: with the previous six sections in mind, we can return to our initial question – what is 
deconstruction?  My analysis has tended toward two answers.  On the one hand, I have provided an 
account of Derrida’s work which leans heavily upon Gasche’s scrupulous interpretation in The Tain 
of the Mirror.  Gasche holds that “deconstruction starts with a systematic elucidation of [textual] 
contradictions”223 and proceeds towards the “grounding”224 of these contradictions through the 
synthetic production of what he calls “infrastructures” (i.e. operative logics of disunity and aporia 
which are “discovered by analyzing the specific organization of”225 the contradictions for which 
they purport to account).  Although my analysis – especially in the last few sections – has largely 
respected and reiterated this account, I do not accept Gasche’s claim that deconstruction is 
inseparably bound to Derrida’s own formal movements, nor do I accept the related claim that its 
relevance is purely philosophical in the narrowest, most institutional sense.  This is because of what 
I called the “spirit” of deconstruction – the “powerful will to explication”226 which radicalizes the 
Socratic mindset and which cuts deconstruction loose from all senses of methodological rigidity.  
Of course – as suggested – it would be wrong to consider deconstruction solely in terms of this 
“spirit” since this would risk our misunderstanding it (e.g. by missing how the deconstructive spirit 
moves far beyond what is ordinarily called the Socratic approach, just as Hegel’s dialectic does) 
and since it would deprive the “spirit” of the terms upon which it is explained and 
(“strategically”227) justified.  We might say then, that there are two deconstructions: one 
historical/methodological/Derridean, and one which is more mystical and enduring – a timeless 
“spirit” of deconstruction which casts its eyes into the “the perhaps”228 of the future (even if it can 
never quite pay off its debts to the past; to the first deconstruction).  While neither version is 
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224 ibid, p.142
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226 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Routledge, 2001) p.102
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dispensable, it is (I think) this latter one – the timeless “spirit” of deconstruction – which is of most 
importance when working towards a relationship between deconstruction and any “non-
philosophical”229 discipline such as law.  And by this I mean that we can emphasize this “spirit” 
(without forgetting its justificatory heritage) as a way of looking towards a new formulation of 
deconstruction, and as way of trying to be not simply “new philosophers” as Derrida puts it, but 
new lawyers, legal theorists, etc.
As Derrida says of his prospective descendants:
“In any case, I am not asking them to be like me…”230
And (perhaps even more revealingly) in Specters of Marx, Derrida says:
“…a certain spirit of Marxism… wants itself to be in principle and explicitly open to its own 
transformation, re-evaluation, self-re-interpretation… [and] deconstruction has never had any 
sense or interest, in my view at least, except as a radicalization, which is to say also in the 
tradition of a certain Marxism, a certain spirit of Marxism…”231
                                               
229 And I believe that this is how we can avoid Gasche’s main criticism of literary deconstructionists; his basic charge 
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p.116)
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CHAPTER TWO:
WHY USE
DECONSTRUCTION?
(OR THE “ETHICS” OF
DECONSTRUCTION)
“Got my finger on the trigger
But I don’t know who to trust
When I look into your eyes
There’s just devils and dust”
Bruce Springsteen, “Devils and Dust”232
                                               
232 Bruce Springsteen, “Devils and Dust” (Sony, 2005)
39
WHY USE DECONSTRUCTION? (OR THE “ETHICS” OF DECONSTRUCTION):
INTRODUCTION:
“Why bother with deconstruction?”233
Good question.  To rephrase: on what grounds can we justify our working within my proposed 
“spirit” of deconstruction?  Do we gain anything from deconstruction?  Or is deconstruction – as so 
many of its critics have accused it234 of being – a dangerous negation of all gains; an intellectual 
terrorist cell which burns and bombs235 the great structures of Western thought (e.g. Platonism, 
structuralism, etc.) with no mind or regard for their replacement?  In other words:
“Is deconstruction consistently anti-foundationalist?  Or is there a foundationalist claim in 
deconstruction which cannot be pragmatized: justice, for example?”236
The answer to both of these questions (and the following chapter will emerge as little more than an 
expansion of this answer) is yes.  To explain: deconstruction is consistently anti-foundationalist, but 
only for the paradoxical sake of a certain foundation – an “ethical demand”237 for anti-
foundationalism which serves as an anti-foundational foundation; an anti-teleological telos.  In 
other words, the “spirit” of my first chapter (i.e. of the recurrent question) is undergirded and 
justified according to a particular conception of justice – one which calls for us to rail-against the 
repressive forces of metaphysical conceit.  And this means that, to answer my original question, we 
should “bother” with deconstruction because it yields ethical gains; because it is the right thing to 
do.  Let us proceed for an explanation.
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SECTION I: “THE ETHICS OF DECONSTRUCTION”238
In this section, I want to try and characterize – by way of a three phase analysis – the transition 
from conventional, metaphysical ethics to an ethics of deconstruction.  Given my suggestion that 
metaphysics is an irreducible human confinement, we can say from the outset that every possible
articulation of ethical responsibility belongs to the order of metaphysics, and that a deconstructive 
(i.e. counter-metaphysical) ethics must entail the radical questioning or “critique”239 of ethical 
pronouncement itself; an ethics-against-ethics we might say – one which “will differ markedly from 
the traditional conception of ethics qua region or branch of philosophy.”240  
There are surely countless ways of rooting and explaining this anti-ethical ethics.  Perhaps the most 
popular approach – and there is certainly good reason for this popularity241 – is to position Derrida 
as an almost unflinching disciple of Emmanuel Levinas: a thinker with whom he holds a great many 
terminological and theoretical similarities.  However, Levinas is not the only figure to whom the 
ethics of deconstruction can be linked, and I want to try and show this by offering an alternative line 
of descent which marks two other theorists – Immanuel Kant and Georges Bataille – as collusively 
influential to at least the same extent as Levinas.
This is certainly not to suggest that theorists following the Levinasian line are on the wrong track.  
Rather, it is merely my attempt to keep with the “spirit” of deconstruction which I tried to divulge 
in the last chapter.  As I suggested, this means refusing to be wooed and entranced by the 
comforting dominance of dominant interpretations, and instead keeping our minds open to the 
manifold possibilities which lurk (for Derrida) within every theory and every text.  This isn’t a 
license to force, mould or rewrite texts, but in this instance at least, no such force would be needed 
anyway: Derrida’s later, explicitly-ethical works are littered with nods to both Kant and Bataille, 
and what these reveal, when thought through, is that the ethics of deconstruction can actually be 
conceived at the end of an almost dialectical exchange between the two.  To explain this claim, the 
following section will offer a brief account of each thinker’s relative moral stance: first Kant, then 
Bataille, then Derrida.  With this scheme in mind, let us proceed.
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Kant’s Conditional Ethics of Respect:
Kant’s theory – in its barest form – is that the moral worth of an action depends on two things: 
firstly whether the action complies with a certain “formal principle of volition”242 which Kant calls 
the “moral law”243 (or the “categorical imperative”244) and secondly whether the action is chosen 
and performed “out of respect... for the moral law”245 and not in the pursuit of some other (i.e. non-
moral, since there is but one moral law) end.  These criteria, in turn, should be backed up by two 
additional notes: firstly that compliance with the “categorical imperative” is a matter of purely
rational deduction, and secondly that “respect... for the moral law” means, as we will see, respect 
for humanity (“whether in your own person or in the person of any other”246).
What then, is Kant’s “categorical imperative”?  The classic formulation – in Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals – is that we should only perform an action if we can consistently will 
that the rational maxim to which it is connected “should become a universal law.”247  This 
formulation is clarified by John Rawls, who translates Kant’s imperative as follows: actions should 
stem from a “sincere legislative intent,”248 which is to say that the actor must be able to will and 
affirm a “perturbed social world”249 in which everyone is always permitted to act as he/she hopes to 
in the present time.  Rawls’ formula, in turn, spawns two questions through which moral worth can 
be deduced:
1. What if we were the direct recipients of our own proposed action?
2. What if we were never the direct recipients of our action, but simply belonged to a society in     
which it was commonly performed and endorsed?
If the answer to either of these questions is that we would have been somehow injured or “robbed... 
of what we require”250/need, then we cannot consistently or sincerely will our maxim as universally 
permissible, and we must conclude that our action is prohibited by the moral law.
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Now: Kant’s moral law (as with all laws) is rooted in a particular conception of “justice and 
beneficence”251 – specifically one which (as I see it) revolves around the idea that we should always 
treat others as we wish to be treated; that other people deserve the same “respect”252 as we might 
accord ourselves out of self-interest (i.e. as if we had a personal stake in their protection, 
contentment, etc.).  The derivative implication here is that there must be “something special”253
about human beings which entitles us to respect, and for Kant, this “something special” is none 
other than our capacity for moral thought/action – what Rawls refers to as our “moral 
personality.”254  There are two aspects of this personality: our rationality (i.e. that which allows for 
our deduction of moral worth) and our freedom/autonomy to act on these deductions – even against 
any opposing “inclination.”255  The compounding of these abilities is, for Kant, what lifts us above 
our animality – thereby making us unique amongst the other inhabitants of the earth and granting us 
membership to what Kant calls a “kingdom of ends”256 (with an “end” being that which deserves 
respect in itself).
At this point, we may wish to applaud Kant’s efforts, since he has seemingly managed to devise and 
ground an ethical system which turns each of us – every subjectively-conceived other (every 
“rational being” whether a saint or a “murderer”257) – into proper (i.e. deserving) objects of 
empathy and respect.  For some, this sort of cross-board inclusion may seem like the ultimate 
ethical gesture, but for me – and in keeping with my proposed “spirit” of deconstruction – this is far 
from the case.  I say this because Kant’s gesture (i.e. his manner of grounding our ethical 
responsibilities) only achieves universal inclusion by simultaneously excluding and disregarding 
the radical “otherness”258 which sets each of us apart, and which makes ethical engagement such a 
tough and therefore admirable pursuit – specifically in the sense that we can never hem in what 
Derrida calls the “risk of the perhaps”259: the insistent chance that the other will meet us in an 
aggressive/harmful fashion.  In other words, Kant’s other is only ever a toothless and predictable 
self-reflection: a de-radicalized other “whose otherness is mere appearance.”260  More on this later.
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Bataille’s Transgressive Ethics of the “Summit”:
The gap between Kant’s ethics and the theory to which I now turn – Bataille’s non-propositional 
“morality of the summit”261 – could hardly be greater or more chasmic.  This gap can, I think, be 
aptly described via three distinctions:
1. As Michel Surya suggests, Bataille distinguishes his own sense of moral worth from “social and 
political morality”262 in general – a bracket which includes not only Kant’s approach, but every 
conceivable system of positive moral pronouncement263(a recognition which [given my previous 
suggestion that Derrida’s ethics involves a “radical questioning of ethical pronouncement itself” 
– see p.40] should make Bataille’s connection to Derrida all too clear).
2. Whilst Kant’s theory attempts to define and regulate the way we relate to one another (i.e. as 
human/rational beings) Bataille’s ethics refuses such limitations.  Instead, Bataille sees ethics 
(and I say this loosely and preliminarily) as a matter of relating to a more general, non-specific 
sense of otherness and alterity – one which presupposes a “dangerous breaking-loose”264 from 
“accepted”265 social standards; a sort of mystical quest for “drunkenness”266 and radical 
“transgression.”267
3. Whilst Kant sees the ultimate object/glory of morality as the transcendence of our animality 
(accrediting ourselves – both in the singular and the plural – with a unique sense of “inalienable 
dignity”268 on account of this transcend-ability) Bataille’s moral aim is the sheer opposite: to 
stage a sensible “return to non-linguistic animal life”269 and to reclaim our animality270 as an 
irrevocable component of our being.
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From these points, this much should be clear: Bataille locates moral worth not in any particular 
conception of “God, justice... [or] reason”271 (i.e. the traditional bases of morality) but in the most 
potent and even reckless anti-authoritarianism – one which characterizes all forms of social 
ordering as hypnotizing effacements “of the individual’s total character.”272  In opposition to these 
effacements, Bataille anticipates a certain inverted, reinvigorated “moral summit”273 which he calls 
“sovereignty”274 – a state which is realized in certain fleeting experiences which exceed the 
“inauthenticity”275 and ideological partiality of our densely-clouded social existence (thereby 
returning us, albeit momentarily and without explanation, to a certain forgotten/repressed “truth”276
of our existence).
Once again, we can bring Derrida back into play here because of his explicit consideration, in 
Writing and Difference, of Bataille’s “sovereignty” and its relationship to a similar concept from 
Hegel’s Phenomenology (“lordship”).  As Derrida explains, each concept refers to a state which is 
ultimately attained “at the height of death”277 (with death being the “moral summit”; the moment in 
which the ghosts of man/society may be “fully revealed”278).  But where Hegel looks to death as a 
“moment in the constitution of meaning… [and] the presentation” of truth, Bataille laughs279 – not  
because he thinks he can outsmart Hegel on this point, but because Hegel is so bold as to think he 
can outsmart death.  We could perhaps sum up Hegel’s audacity – at least as Bataille sees it – via 
three points:
1. For Bataille, “death has no meaning”280or sense, and Hegel – he who “knows no other aim than 
knowledge”281 – errs in believing otherwise (i.e. that death can be appropriated, systematized, 
and even profited from).
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2. To quote Derrida, “it does not suffice to risk death if the putting at stake is not permitted to take 
off, as a chance or accident, but is rather invested as... work.”282  In other words, Hegel’s 
prospective candidate for “lordship” never actually experiences anything in his risk, because it 
is only ever conducted with an eye for a certain “effect and profit”283 – not as a raw, un-
tempered, unpredictable “expenditure”284 (i.e. one which would experience death as 
“immanence”285 – risk is not the same as immanence).
3. To really gain from death – to really experience (without understanding) its abyssal 
“nothingness”286 – would not simply be to risk it, but to actually die, and to lose the life in 
which such a gain could be sensed, perceived and enjoyed.  As Bataille puts it, “for man finally 
to be revealed to himself he would have to die, but he would have to do so while living – while 
watching himself cease to be.”287
This last point is not just directed at Hegel, but at Bataille himself, who knows all too well that the 
real summit (i.e. the most stark, pure escape from dull, “inauthentic” life) is unlivable, 
unsustainable and impossible.  This doesn’t negate the possibility of certain minor transgressions –
ritual sacrifice, erotic experience, the indulgent consumption of festivals (all of which are linked to 
death as similar instances of unproductive expenditure288 – but these are only ever ways of trying to 
do the impossible; to live the deathly summit.  And with this recognition, we could summarize 
Bataille’s ethical stance as follows: ethics is a matter of resisting “all forms of constraint” (or 
repression, noting the link to my prior comments on deconstruction) but this is impossible.  Ethics –
in its truest form – is impossible.
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Derrida’s Unconditional Ethics of Hospitality:
“…inasmuch as it is… the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as 
our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the 
experience of hospitality…”289
Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness
My remarks on Bataille’s “morality of the summit” have, I think, revealed a fairly clear-cut kinship 
between his Nietzschean philosophy of exposure and Derrida’s deconstruction.  Bataille and 
Derrida are both fundamentally anti-authority (i.e. anti- ideological inhibitors) and they both 
think/write in search of certain impossible “transgressions” which would let us experience 
something in excess of all authorit(ies).  However, when Derrida finally came – in the late 
80’s/early 90’s290 – to comment explicitly on the underlying ethical implications of his work, the 
resultant system (i.e. non-system or system) was far from a restatement of Bataille’s implied 
morality of “evil”291 (where “evil” stands for the supersession of all conventional configurations 
of “good”).
The major difference at stake here (i.e. between Bataille’s ethics and Derrida’s) is that for Derrida, 
the object of transgression is always to better serve the “interhuman relationship”292 – the
relationship which lies at the heart of more traditional moral theories like Kant’s.  And in this sense, 
the ethics of deconstruction can taken to mark a kind of return to Kant; a strange “turn-back” which 
pairs the solidity of Kant’s metaphysics with Bataille’s counter-metaphysical quest for the summit.  
Is this really surprising?  After all, I have already stressed the sense in which Derrida always affirms
metaphysical pronouncement and systemization as indissolubly necessary – which is to say that, at 
the very least, Derrida knows that Bataille’s overarching super-law (his “great law”293 or “the
law”294) of transgression would be nothing without a certain stock of minor, formal laws295 (i.e. 
positive ethical pronouncements like those formulated by Kant) which compensate for and limit the 
dangerous impracticality of ceaseless chasing excess.
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However: the more significant sense of Derrida’s “turn-back” – aside from his recognizing the 
unflinching necessity of metaphysics – is (as suggested above) his sharing of Kant’s belief that we 
are positively obliged to treat each other well; with respect.  The only catch is that, whereas Kant 
sets about (repressively) grounding his obligation in a particular conception of human nature, 
Derrida revokes every such ground, opting instead to treat the “interhuman” obligation as an 
inexplicable and unconditional necessity – a pressing but mystical demand which can be felt/sensed 
rather than fully understood.  The mysticism of this demand can be conceived (to make things really 
interesting) as yet another volte-face, this time moving from Kant back to Bataille (who is often 
seen “as a mystic rather than… a philosopher”296).  And what we can take from this back-and-forth 
(I think) is that Derrida’s ethics pushes these two thinkers into a sort of dialectical exchange where 
each compensates for the insufficiencies and blindspots of the other.
The only way to put this interpretation to the test – to assess its “fit”297 as Dworkin might say – is to 
read it alongside what Derrida actually says about ethics.  Although there is too little space here to 
extensively explore what I called his “nods”298 to Kant and Bataille, a brief relay of Derrida’s 
theory – specifically as it appears in his short but pivotal book, Of Hospitality – should suffice in 
providing some basic support for my argument.  To this end, consider the following points:
1. Derrida finds a certain truth in Socrates’ complaining that he is “not even... treated as a 
foreigner”299 in his native Athens.  For Socrates, the official (i.e. legal/institutional) reception of 
the foreigner (“not simply the absolute other”300 but the identifiable/verifiable non-national) is 
always an accommodating one, since the hospitable host will “naturally excuse”301 the plethora 
of linguistic and cultural differences which mark the foreigner as such.  The citizen, on the other 
hand, is accorded nowhere near this level of tolerance – even though he will inevitably (by the 
logic of différance) have his “own idiom [and]... way of speaking”302 in much the same way as 
the foreigner.
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2. This means, for Derrida, that each of us is a foreigner to every other, and that the only way to 
do each other justice is to treat each other accordingly.  But what does this “accordingly” mean?  
In other words, how should we receive the foreigner?  How can we do him/her justice?  On the 
one hand, it is plain enough that any reception begins – indeed, can only begin – with questions 
(e.g. “what is your name?” or “where have you come from?”).  But on the other hand, aren’t 
these questions really demands (i.e. in the sense that every question demands an answer) in 
much the same way as Kant demands our rational autonomy?  And if they are, would it not be 
more “just and loving... not to question”303 but to simply receive the foreigner: not as a foreigner 
in the knowable/verifiable sense but as “something altogether other”304 – “an anonymous new 
arrival”305 who we welcome and accept without conditions, without demands, and without 
anything tantamount to “police inquisition”306?
3. This is certainly where ethical worth lies for Derrida – in “absolute, hyperbolical, unconditional 
hospitality”307 and in the accompanying “risk”308 that our open arms will be met by a dangerous 
criminal; a “parasite”309 rather than a friend.  But even as this risk injects ethical depth and 
“value”310 into our engagement with others, so it also destroys the very possibility of realizing 
such “value” since it screams out (as a risk; because of its status as risk) to be curbed as much 
as to be pursued.  This means that Derrida’s law of “unconditional hospitality” must – as a 
matter of an opposing ethical duty – be actively legislated against so as to ensure a level of 
practical protection for both ourselves and our families/communities.  And in this sense, we can 
say that Derrida’s conception of justice has the structure of an aporetic double bind: we have an 
obligation to serve justice (i.e. “pure” hospitality) as an ideal, but only against an opposing 
obligation to be ever-mindful of how this ideal enters the world (i.e. of its potential effects).  
The ideal might come first311 – but it cannot come last312 and it cannot be realized.
                                               
303 ibid, p.29
304 The Politics of Friendship, p.36
305 Of Hospitality, p.25
306 Jacques Derrida, “The Principle of Hospitality” in Parallax (2005, vol.11, no.1) p.7 – Hereafter referenced as “The 
Principle of Hospitality”
307 Of Hospitality, p.135
308 It is important to note the link with Bataille here – a link which is evident elsewhere when Derrida talks about a 
“welcome without reserve and calculation” and “an exposure without limit” – see “The Principle of Hospitality” p.6
309 Of Hospitality, p.61
310 Bataille’s preferred term for denoting moral worth – See Surya, p.432
311 To quote Derrida, “it is always in the name of pure and hyperbolic hospitality that it is necessary... to invent the best 
arrangements... the most just legislation [my emphasis] – see “Principles of Hospitality” p.6
312 And this is because we don’t exist in a utopian world of ideal principles, but in a natural/practial world; a “factical” 
world.  In this sense, Derrida’s ethics could be taken as an amendment of Kant’s infamous distinction between the 
natural law of the “starry heavens… and the moral law within” (see Rawls, p.160).  For Derrida, both laws are crucial in 
deducing moral/ethical worth, even though they are in the frustrating position of being mutually exclusive (hence 
Derrida’s belief in the impossibility of ethical fulfillment).
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These points only give us scantest impression of Derrida’s ethics, but they are (I think) enough to 
do two things:
1. They support my claim that Derrida’s ethics can be seen as the “sublated” product of the two 
other theories which I have analyzed in this section, and;
2. They support – given that they point to the same conceptual conflict (i.e. between the ideal and 
the practical) that I have highlighted with reference to the “aporia of the beginning” – my claim 
as to the absolute continuity of Derrida’s theoretical focus.
With these points in mind, let us now proceed to the next section for a deeper, more thorough 
explanation of Derrida’s ethics and for a first glimpse at how it relates to legal theory.
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SECTION II: THE TRAGEDY OF THE (JUDICIAL) PROCESS
The last section – because it was so focused on parentage – lacked detail with regard to Derrida’s 
own thoughts on ethics.  To remedy this lack, I now propose a “close reading”313 of Derrida’s 
seminal text, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority”314 – an essay which is often 
cited as the watershed moment of his supposed “ethico-political”315 turn.  Initially conceived as a 
keynote address for a Cardozo law symposium, “Force of Law” can be gauged primarily as a 
treatise on the relationship between deconstruction, law and justice.  And in this sense, a focused 
reading can serve us doubly by:
1. Deepening our understanding of Derrida’s ethics, and;
2. Introducing us to Derrida, the legal theorist, and to the prescriptive implications which his 
philosophy holds for specifically legal interpreters.
To these points, we could even add a third, because “Force of Law” also stands as one of Derrida’s 
more clear-cut attempts to divulge the central aporia of my first chapter, which means that it can, I 
think, help to imply the career-long consistency of Derrida’s position – a consistency which is so 
crucial to my theory of a cohesive “spirit” of deconstruction.  Also: all three of these points are – on 
my reading – dealt with most cogently in the first half of Derrida’s text, and I will therefore be 
making this first half my primary focus.  With all of this in mind, let us now turn to the text.
                                               
313 Christopher Norris, “Introduction” in Jacques Derrida, Positions (Continuum, 2005) p.xxiii
314 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” (11 Cardozo Law Review 1990) – Hereafter 
referenced as “Force of Law”
315 See, for example, Michael Rosenfeld, “Derrida’s Ethical Turn and America” (Vol.27:2 Cardozo Law Review 2005) 
p.815 (where Rosenfeld refers to “Force of Law” as the essay which “more than any other single work marks the advent 
of [Derrida’s] ethical turn”)
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“Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority”
“The mystic curiosity of deconstruction is mentioned right up there in the title of the essay that 
catapulted deconstruction into the concerns of twentieth century legal theory – the mystical 
foundation of authority.  Derrida was upfront and considerate enough to state the concern of the 
essay straight away…”316
Johan van der Walt, “Law and Deconstruction”
In concurrence with the above remarks, I want to begin by attempting a base-level explication of 
Derrida’s title. There are two divisions which strike me as particularly useful to this end: the first is 
between the two title phrases, “force of law” and “the mystical foundation of authority”; the second 
is between two ways in which these phrases relate to one another – one relatively non-
specific/colloquial, and one which relies directly upon Derrida’s infamous theory of language as 
différance.  With these divisions in mind, let us start by examining the more basic (i.e. “non-
specific”) implications behind the first title phrase.
Early on in the text, Derrida picks up on the English word “enforceability”317 – an idiom which he 
claims to be “invaluable”318 because of its ability to remind “us that there is no such thing as law... 
that doesn’t imply in itself…in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being 
enforced”319 via police action.  In other words, the concept of law is, by definition, inseparable from 
the incessant threat that violence320 (i.e. “law-preserving violence”321 to quote Walter Benjamin) 
will be dealt out upon non-compliers.  To adopt a somewhat colourful comparison, the symbol of 
the guard dog could be summoned as an apt characterization: sure, the dog can bark, but to guard
(i.e. to obtain the most basic and “generic sense of efficacy”322) it also has to bite – especially when 
faced with the ever-looming figure of the Holmesian “badman”323 (he who will do as much as he 
can get away with).
                                               
316 Johan van der Walt, “Law and Deconstruction” in Veitch, Christodoulidis & Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes & 
Concepts (Routledge, 2012)
317 “Force of Law” p.925
318 ibid, p.935
319 ibid, p.925
320 A fact which, according to Robert Cover, is all too often forgotten/neglected by legal theorists.  See Robert Cover, 
“Violence and the Word” (95 Yale Law Review 1985 – 1986)
321 Costas Douzinas, “Violence, Justice, Deconstruction” in German Law Journal (Vol.06, No.01) p.172 (Quoting 
Benjamin)
322 Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception (University of Chicago Press, 2005) p.37 – Hereafter referenced as “The 
State of Exception”
323 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law” at http://www.constitution.org/lrev/owh/path_law.htm
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From this recognition of an “intimate”324 connection between law and violence, Derrida asks how 
we can effectively “distinguish between... [the] force of the law... and the violence that one always 
deems unjust”325 (i.e. illegal/anti-social violence).  The common presumption – especially “in the 
modern epoch”326 of Western democracy – is that the first, physical “force of law” is inseparably 
bound to a second, moral “force” which justifies it.  For me, this perception can be traced to (at 
least) three features of modern law: 
1. Its democratic production (i.e. by representative bodies);
2. Its “untouchability”327 (i.e. in a rule-of-law-not-men sense) and;
3. Its general know-ability;
The merits of the first two are well-known, and require no added explanation here.  However, it is, I 
think, well-worth offering a brief explanation of my third point – perhaps something like this: 
“know-ability” gives the violence of law a forewarned character which other forms of violence lack.  
And, if we accept Nietzsche’s claim that (one of) our most basic instinct(s)328 is the pursuit of 
control, we can understand the justification of legal violence precisely on the grounds that we can 
avoid it (i.e. control its infliction upon us) by adjusting our own conduct.
This is where the “mystical foundation of authority” comes in.  Because no matter how democratic 
or untouchable or knowable the laws of a given system seem, there can be no denying that there 
will have been, without exception, a system-founding act which lacked all of these legitimating 
features.  To explain: the founding act – as a nothing-to-something beginning – can refer back to no 
law (i.e. no sense of “anterior legitimacy”329) which would anticipate or justify it.  And this means 
that – as a child of what we might call unjustified or justification-pending “imposition”330 – the 
system is infected, from the start, by the purportedly exorcized violence which, in the perception of 
its exorcism, gives law its moral sheen.  As Derrida puts it: 
“the violence of the foundation… must envelope the violence of conservation and cannot 
break with it [my emphasis]…”331
                                               
324 Costas Douzinas, “Violence, Justice, Deconstruction” in German Law Journal (Vol.06, No.01) p.172
325 “Force of Law” p.927
326 The State of Exception, p.37
327 ibid
328 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm
329 “Force of Law” p.927
330 “an imposition without a present justification” – Drucilla Cornell, “The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed 
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331 ibid, p.1055 (Quoting “Force of Law”)
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To gain a fuller grasp of this logic, we might look to Giorgio Agamben’s recognition of the way in 
which the phrase “force of law” has been used as a “technical legal term”332 for the status of 
binding executive orders.  Such orders, for Agamben, are especially characteristic of “state[s] of 
exception”333 – situations where the difficult particularity of a “political crisis”334 is dealt with by 
suspending inflexible, formal law in favour of sovereign decree.  In these instances, the “force of 
law” (i.e. its “capacity to bind”335) is separated out from the “formal essence”336 (i.e. the 
democratic, untouchable, knowable essence) which legitimates it.  And for Agamben, this means 
that:
“The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without 
law (which should therefore be written: force of law).  Such a force-of-law, in which 
potentiality and act are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical element, or 
rather a fictio by means of which the law seeks to annex anomie itself…”337
“Something like a mystical element” writes Agamben – an “element” which mirrors Derrida’s 
“mystical foundation” to the utmost point of precision.  To explain: the state of exception – as a 
period in which state-sanctioned violence loses its more traditional lines of justification – is not so 
much a legal anomaly as it is the “return of the repressed”338 truth of the system; the moment in 
which, by appearing as little more than imposition-for-its-own-sake, the law drops its moral mask to 
(temporarily) revel in the groundless violence of its origin.  In other words, what is commonly 
called the exception is not an exception at all, but the secret rule; the condition which
simultaneously enables (i.e. because the legal system “must begin” somewhere – in a space prior to 
itself and its justification) and de-legitimates (i.e. because “law never catches up with… [the] 
projected justification”339 of its origin) every legal pronouncement, thereby putting law (i.e. as a 
purportedly moral concept) firmly under erasure.  As Drucilla Cornell summizes:
“the difference between acceptable and unacceptable violence… is ultimately not cognitively 
accessible in advance… [and therefore] the practical erasure of the mystical foundation of 
authority by the legal system must be told as a horror story”340
                                               
332 The State of Exception, p.38
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337 ibid
338 Sigmund Freud, “Repression” at http://files.meetup.com/382157/Freud%20-%20Repression%20(1915).pdf – p.2984
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Now: the argument above is only the first way in which we can understand the interaction between 
Derrida’s title phrases.  I initially called this the “non-specific” way of understanding these phrases, 
and by this I mean that the sense and success of Derrida’s argument are not necessarily reliant – in 
logico-theoretical terms – on his earlier discoveries regarding language and différance, which is to 
say that his argument could (in theory) be well-made by someone who disregarded these
discoveries.341  However, we should not stop here, because the “non-specific” version of Derrida’s 
argument can be enriched exponentially by pointing out the more “specific” ways in which the title 
and the essay as a whole tie in with Derrida’s broader theory (i.e. with his system of différance).  
After all, Derrida says himself that the “question of language and idiom”342 lies right “at the 
heart”343 of his thoughts on law – a recognition which indicates, at the very least, an intentional
connection between his legal and linguistic theories.344
The immediate result of this inter-theoretical connection is this: law is but one example of linguistic 
expression, and the de-legitimation of law’s origin – and of all of its subsequent moves insofar as 
they rely on that origin – must have therefore been presupposed and (arguably) accomplished by 
Derrida’s earlier de-legitimation of every origin (i.e. every attempt at an “exit from language”345) 
via différance.  This means that the originary groundlessness which haunts the system – which 
makes it a legal system in Agamben’s terms – is not a problem which is unique to law so much as 
an active manifestation of the problem which Derrida finds behind all attempts to generate sense; to 
exercise our “will to power”346 over the world.  In other words, it is the “différance of law”347 which 
keeps it estranged from its purported moral referent in a “nothing outside the [legal] text” sort of 
way. 
                                               
341 In fact, Robert Cover made a strikingly similar argument without relying on any aspect of Derrida’s thought.  See 
Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word” (95 Yale Law Review 1985 - 1986).  It is also notable that Costas Douzinas has 
spoken of the way that what I called the “non-specific” argument is made more problematic and more troubling by the 
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Douzinas, “Violence, Justice, Deconstruction” in German Law Journal (Vol.06, No.01) p.173
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h/4363-h.htm
347 Beardsworth, p.29
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With this in mind, we can now take a shot at a slightly more contextual and layered interpretation of 
Derrida’s title.  First of all, we can recognize différance as the “mystical foundation of authority” in 
the sense that:
1. It prevents legal authority from appealing to “anything but its own mystique”348 and;
2. It is itself a sort of “mystical” beyond; a logic of disunity which exceeds the only logic/language 
(i.e. of metaphysics) within which we can think/speak it.
Second of all, we can reinterpret the phrase “force of law” as the violence which lives within law-
as-language. This violence poses a particular problem in the sense that:
1. It is connected to such serious, real-world consequences (i.e. because it is backed up by the 
physical “force of law”) and;
2. It ensures that every legal act – apart from reiterating and affirming the groundlessness of the 
origin – also stands as a sort of groundless origin in itself, at least insofar as it either creates and 
imposes a false unification of idioms (i.e. as with legislative acts) or substitutes a personal and 
equally unverifiable idiom for this first, false unification (i.e. as with judicial acts).
When we put all of this together – the double violence (i.e. physical and linguistic) of law and the 
de-legitimation of its every movement (i.e. insofar as every act constitutes a fresh and “absolutely 
[un]justified” point of departure) via différance – we get to the groundbreaking claim that law is 
tainted, at every turn, by a deep and ineradicable sense of “philosophical bankruptcy”349 which 
extinguishes every claim of its inherent moral force.  In other words, law is only ever “force without 
justice,”350 “violence masqueraded as”351 something more.
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“Aporia[s] of judgment”352
“...if right or law stems from vengeance... can one not yearn for a justice that one day, a day 
belonging no longer to history, a quasi-messianic day, would finally be removed from the fatality 
of vengeance”353
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx
Derrida’s assertion that law is “force without justice”354 is a bold one.  It is bold, in particular, 
because it goes against the West’s deep-set belief that justice is a matter of giving “everyone his 
own”355 (i.e. of compensating the injured and injuring the injurers356) and that law – given that is 
has the force to compel this giving – is the righteous path to justice itself.  The problem which 
Derrida finds in this conception, as we have seen, is that we lack any “absolutely justified” way of 
determining where such justice might lie, which ultimately means that the violent enforcement of 
any particular determination of justice is always in violation of something higher – a “summit” of 
justice where the dream of taking a “step beyond repression”357 (i.e. beyond the unjustified 
repression of metaphysics) comes alive in the name of the Other.  And for Derrida, this “step” is 
none other than that of his own deconstruction.  “Deconstruction... [the insistent spirit of the 
question, of the suspense of the Aufhebung, of fearless affirmation] is justice.”358
It is perhaps unsurprising then – given that deconstruction is so thoroughly concerned with 
interpretation; with intra-textuality and the focused study of linguistic coherence – that Derrida 
should turn his attention, about half way through his Cardozo address, to the role of the judge and 
the non-dischargeable obligations which are placed upon him by the ethics of deconstruction.  Apart 
from being complicit with (and repeating) the groundless violence of the origin, the judge must also 
– by the logic of Derrida’s différance – be guilty of linguistic violence; of inflicting his own 
interpretive idiom upon the present-parties and (if stare decisis applies) upon the system itself.  
Worse still, this double-edged violence – this violence of the past (i.e. of the origin) and of the 
                                               
352 Law as Sacrifice, p.205
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present (i.e. of the fresh, interpretive origin) – is always also connected to the promise of future 
violence; the physical “force of law” which is given immediate warrant by the “word”359 of the 
judge.  To quote Robert Cover: “legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death... a 
judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, someone loses his freedom, his 
property, his children, even his life.”360
The stakes then, could hardly be higher.  And with these stakes – with his own violent tendencies 
lurking at every turn – the judge is effectively stranded between two poles of non-negotiability.  On 
the one hand, his obligation to negotiate the minefield of these tendencies is non-negotiable in its 
status as an ethical demand.  On the other hand, this minefield is non-negotiable in itself, which is 
to say that its successful, non-violent traversal is utterly impossible.  Does this not ring a little 
familiar by now?  The judge “must begin” his deliberations, but he is doomed to begin (and to 
proceed) in a manner lacking “absolute” justification.  This is (evidently) a situation-specific 
reiteration of my first chapter aporia, and in his Cardozo address, Derrida allows this aporia to 
divide itself across three practical but non-exhaustive manifestations regarding the judge’s quest for 
justice.  To these manifestations (i.e. these “aporia[s] of justice”361) I now turn.
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“First aporia: epokhe and rule”362:  Most people in Western democracies believe that judges should 
always restrict themselves to deciding cases on points of law – that their decisions should be 
“programmable, deducible... computable”363 applications of prior legal rules rather than arbitrary 
acts of imposition.  However, as we have seen, Derrida believes that every legal act is a certain type 
of arbitrary imposition, which is to say that, at root, there is no way to distinguish between the 
acceptable impositions of the legislature and the supposedly unacceptable ones of so-called 
“judicial activists”364 – both of which are flatly de-legitimated by the différance of law.  The 
question then, is how judges should respond to the violent impositions of the legislature?  In 
respectful subservience?  Or in violence; by re-evaluating and amending the law as they see fit (“as 
if ultimately nothing previously existed of the law”365)?  The answer, according to Derrida, is that 
justice calls for a simultaneous and therefore impossible commitment to (and practice of) both 
options:
“...for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be 
both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend 
it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation 
and the new and free confirmation of its principle”366
For me, this fits fairly straightforwardly with what I have said so far – particularly with the “aporia 
of the beginning” from my first chapter.  We need law, in practical terms, for the sake of social 
order.  But given the unjustified/unjust status which Derrida’s theory attaches to every conceivable 
legal provision, we also need to keep questioning whether this or that law367 – or at least our 
favoured interpretation of this or that law – really gives us the “best arrangements”368 through 
which to pursue the (albeit unreachable) ideal of justice (i.e. “an exposure without limit... without 
reserve and without calculation”369).
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“Second aporia: the ghost of the undecidable”370:  It is relatively uncontroversial, I think, to say that 
all litigation stems from some level of disagreement.  There might be disagreement over the facts to 
which a given law should be applied, or there might be disagreement about which law should be 
applied to these facts.  There might even be disagreement over what law is (“theoretical 
disagreement”371 as Dworkin puts it) and, derivatively, over which types of propositions and 
principles are deserving of legal status.  Whatever the point of contention, the judge – at least 
according to the popular iconology of the West – arrives on the scene to put disagreement to bed; to 
say once and for all which side is right and which is wrong.  And for Derrida, this means that the 
judge can never exercise his authority “without a decision that cuts, that divides”372 – a decision 
that, even as it tries to do justice by and perhaps also through the law, will always inflict a 
heightened level of physical and linguistic injustice upon the losing party by denying his idiom and 
by violently ripping something from him in the process (i.e. “his freedom, his property, his children, 
even his life”373).
This is why “there is no moment in which a decision can be called presently and fully just”374 –
because a decision can only give with one hand, can only affirm one side while it does violence to 
and represses the idiomatic singularity of the other.  This means that the possibility of justice –
since every decision is one-sided, repressive, unjust, etc. – must live in a certain pre-decisive
moment, one in which neither claim has been stamped as truer than the other; where each still 
bristles with the viability which all things possess before the brutal but utterly unavoidable 
“economy of repression.”375  However, to give in to this “ordeal of the undecidable”376 – to 
perpetuate its suspense in the name of the ideal – is “not just either, for only a decision can be 
just.”377  In other words, the ideal is once again nothing without the practical, even as the practical 
kills the ideal.  This is aporia; mutual destruction:
“one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is just’ and 
even less ‘I am just’, without immediately betraying justice…”378
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“Third aporia: the urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge”379:  Even if justice makes the 
suicidal demand for the decision which kills it, we may still take comfort in the hope that this 
decision can be approached with care, and that its ultimate groundlessness can perhaps be 
somewhat made up for if the judge makes a genuine and determined effort to take each side 
seriously (i.e. to begin by assuming the viability of each claim and the resultant “undecidability” of 
the case).  However, Derrida is quick to burst this bubble by suggesting that a “just decision [which 
would be impossible anyway] is always required immediately”380 – in a moment of raw, screaming 
urgency.  To quote Derrida:
“...a just decision... cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited 
knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it... and even if it 
did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself time, all the time and all the necessary 
facts about the matter, the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of 
urgency and precipitation... since it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or 
politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it”381
There are, I think, two layers of this urgency.  The first is the simple social/political urgency which 
calls for the decision for the sake of order and progress – to keep things moving and to keep 
disagreements from dragging on ad infinitum.  This, however, is preceded by a second sense of 
urgency: that which kicks in because of the inevitable prematurity of the decision; because the 
decision – no matter how long it could be mulled over, no matter how much the first kind of 
urgency could be curbed – will always arrive before it has been able to “absolutely” justify itself; in 
a moment of “madness”382 and as a “leap”383 of faith.  And this means that, once again, we are 
faced with a conflict between the ideal and the practical, the dream and the reality: the dream begs 
for care, meticulousness, and the dedicated gathering of applicable resources; the reality is that we 
never have time for these things – not because time is short but because no amount of time could 
deliver the sure-fire justification which we seek.
                                               
379 ibid, p.967
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382 “the instant of decision is a madness” – “Force of Law” p.967 (Quoting Kierkegaard – a quote which also appears in 
Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference [Routledge, 2001] 
p.36)
383 John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell (Fordham University Press, 1996) p.137
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Conclusion: The Tragedy of the (Judicial) Process
“If the tragic tradition proclaims a crisis in the dialectical politics of reciprocity, deconstruction 
does something similar, although Derrida prefers to speak of an ‘aporetic moment’ rather than a 
crisis… the moment when symbolic systems come up against aporias which cannot be argued 
away by dialectical logic… [in other words] if deconstruction has one truly distinctive feature it 
could be... [the affirmation of] the indissoluble aporia which always disrupts symbolic structures.  
Deconstruction thereby proves itself an heir to the tragic tradition”384
Danie Goosen, “Deconstruction and Tragedy: A Comparison”
Where can we go from here?  The judge – assuming that we buy into the “aporetics”385 of 
Derridean morality – is trapped, hapless and helpless, in the inescapable jaws of a Catch-22.  Every 
move he makes, however measured and tentative, will be the wrong one.  Every thought in his 
mind, however well-intentioned, will be a violent, one-sided denial.  So to repeat: where can we –
as the judge’s hypothetical, ethical advisers – go from here?  What advice can we give?  The most 
“natural”386 response (following the likes of Nietzsche and Freud) is surely to seek out a point of 
unification; a metaphysical annulment to ease the displeasure of our confusion.  But this would 
hardly be in keeping with Derrida’s broader project, would it?
Not at all.  In fact, we have already encountered Derrida’s starkest judicial prescription – namely 
his controversial proclamation that “deconstruction is justice.”  This means, contrary (at least 
seemingly) to Derrida’s claims elsewhere, that justice is possible in a mystical, fleeting sense; in the 
almost non-existent moment when a judge sees the tragic plurality of his interpretive options.  In 
other words, the ethics of deconstruction demands that judges must (as far as possible) seek out the 
tragedy of legal texts/situations – not as a trivial or “supplementary”387 obligation, but as the
obligation which makes their decision a decision: not a just decision of course, but simply a
decision in the sense of a real, unscripted “event.”388
                                               
384 Danie Goosen, “Deconstruction and Tragedy: A Comparison” (1998 Acta Juridica 21) p.32
385 See, for example, John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell (Fordham University Press, 1996) p.31
386 By which I mean to reference Nietzsche’s will-to-power and Freud’s early formulations of the pleasure principle.  
See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (Vintage, 1968) and Sigmund Freud, The Penguin Freud Reader (Penguin, 
2006) for explorations of these ideas.
387 By which I mean to reference the Derridean concept of “supplementarity” described earlier.
388 “the event of what may happen” – The Politics of Friendship, p.30
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Tragedy then, is one more way – the most explicitly-ethical way perhaps – of describing the 
counter-metaphysical heart of Derrida’s work.  We should take note though: Derrida’s view of 
tragedy is distinct from, for example, the one espoused by Hegel in his “reading”389 of Sophocles’ 
Antigone.  For Hegel, the tragedy of the Antigone is not in the indissolubility of its inter-system 
dispute (i.e. between the “human [and the]... divine”390) but in the fact that this dispute plays out 
between two characters who are blind to its status as a dispute in a genuine, philosophical sense.  
This means that, in Hegel’s eyes, tragedies (like the Antigone) are not tragic because they are 
logically insoluble, but because their solubility can only reveal itself through a dialectical unfolding 
which plays out – and here’s the tragic rub – in the very failures and frustrations and agonies which 
it would have avoided had it been available in foresight.  
For Derrida, Hegel errs here in much the same way as he does (to hark-back to my last section) in 
his consideration of death.  In other words, he (wrongly) imports a sense of productivity into the 
concept of tragedy when, in truth, the tragedy of tragedy is that it yields nothing at all; that it is 
doomed to repeat itself regardless of how many Greek plays its victims might have studied.  And 
this means that, in terms of the Antigone, Derrida’s hero (and the ultimate role model for the 
deconstructionist judge) might just be the bumbling guard who comes before Creon bearing bad, 
and possibly self-implicating news:
“Sir, I wouldn’t exactly say I was panting to get here.  Far from it.  As a matter of fact, I was
more for turning back.  I was over a barrel.  One part of me was saying, ‘Only a loony would 
walk himself into this’ and another part was saying, ‘You’d be a bigger loony not to get to 
Creon first’… But when all was said and done there was only thing for it: get here, get it out 
and get it over no matter what… what will be, says I, will be…”391
Here we have it – the two features of the decision which the judge must (as a matter of morals) 
recognize:
1. Its un-decidability and;
2. Its must-decidability.
                                               
389 Derrida confronts this reading in Glas – for a blow-by-blow account of this confrontation, see Simon Critchley, 
“Derrida’s Reading of Hegel in Glas” in Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity (Verso, 1999) pp.1 – 28; for the 
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CONCLUSION:
“Got my finger on the trigger
But I don’t know who to trust
When I look into your eyes
There’s just devils and dust”392
Bruce Springsteen, “Devils & Dust”
Having opened this chapter with the above excerpt, I now want to close by finally explaining its 
relevance.  My interpretation is this: the judge is the one with his “finger on the trigger” – poised 
(and absolutely required, as per the necessity of metaphysics) to issue his decision.  But for Derrida, 
as we have seen, there is no “absolutely justified” way of knowing “who to trust” (i.e. which way to 
decide).  This is because the judge can only see “devils” (i.e. his own ideological weaknesses and 
inhibitions – those which he projects into the presumed consciousness of the “Other”) and “dust” 
(i.e. nothing else) in the eyes of those he confronts; the parties before him.  In other words: the 
judge can never see past himself; can never see more than his own, tired truth; can never see what 
he would need to see to really “trust” in his decision.
Even here – in my (temporary/expedient) reduction of Derrida’s ethics into four lines of a pop song 
– we can hardly miss the recurrence of the aporia of the beginning: of the war between the ideal and 
the practical which lives within the concept of ethics as an aporetic headache.  And as I have 
suggested, it is this headache (i.e. this tragedy) which the judge must feel above all else, or rather, 
which he must strive to feel over and above the destructive one-sidedness of his psyche.  Sure, his 
decision will be violent, but the judge can enter this violence having first experienced something 
else – a radical openness (or even an abyssal terror) which is completely foreign to the order of 
violence (i.e. metaphysics) itself.  This is what deconstruction begs of the judge; this is why 
deconstruction is so (as I put it in chapter one) “called-for” – because it is offers us something (a 
“flicker” or a “snap” perhaps) other than violence.
                                               
392 Bruce Springsteen, “Devils & Dust” (Sony, 2005)
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CHAPTER THREE:
LEGAL
DECONSTRUCTION-
ISM: FROM THEORY
TO PRACTICE
“Deconstruction has a tremendous stake in interpretation: but what would it tell us when the 
interpretation intersects with, or, better yet, is presented as, practice?”393
Antonio Negri, “The Specter’s Smile”
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LEGAL DECONSTRUCTION(ISM): FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION:
I have thus far defined deconstruction as a sort of “ethically-spirited” interpretation; a brand of 
reading (or perhaps merely “perception”) which strives for openness as an ethical “aspiration.”394  
Given the vagueness of this aspiration – and given the sense in which it seems to precede all action, 
all politics, etc. – we must now ask whether there are any positive prescriptions which might guide 
the interpreter (i.e. the legal interpreter – specifically the judge) in its pursuit.  In other words, what 
happens when we move from theory to practice; when we branch out (beyond the abstract 
mysticism of Derrida’s writing) into the domain of action and consequence?
To answer this question, I have chosen to examine two versions of what we might call 
contemporary legal “deconstructionism”395 – one proposed by Yale Law Professor, Jack Balkin, 
and one proposed (implicitly I might add) by CLS radical/Harvard Law Professor, Duncan 
Kennedy.  These are not necessarily the best or most Derrida-faithful attempts to integrate 
deconstruction into the legal realm, but they do represent (for me) the two classic integrative 
mindsets – that which seeks to tame/de-radicalize and that which seeks to extend/radicalize.  To 
explain who does what and how successful they are, let us now proceed to the analysis – starting 
with Balkin.
                                               
394 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1977) chapter 1
395 And the addition of the (ism) is to denote the growing “trendiness” which has led to many of the “contemporary” 
encounters with deconstruction – see, for example, Robert Locke, “Deconstructing Deconstructionism” at 
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=24199 – an article which repeats the trendy conflation between 
deconstruction and post-structuralism.
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SECTION I: JACK BALKIN’S “DOMESTICATION OF DECONSTRUCTION”396
Jack Balkin’s “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory”397 – published three years prior to “Force 
of Law” – is perhaps the earliest comprehensive attempt to introduce deconstruction to a legal 
audience.  To be sure, many theorists (“particularly feminists and members of the Critical Legal 
Studies [i.e. CLS] movement”398) had already tried to integrate Derridean ideas and “techniques”399
into their respective legal theories, but never – at least to my knowledge – in a way which directly 
referenced or explained the deeper, philosophical roots of those ideas.  In a sense then, Balkin’s 
essay arrived on the scene in much the same vein as The Communist Manifesto: as a spectral 
exposure, one which would give flesh and substance to a spirit which had been “haunting”400
Anglo-American law departments for at least a decade; “the specter of” deconstruction.
Despite its timely ambition, Balkin’s account of deconstruction begins with a pretty grave mistake –
namely a malignant mistreatment of Derrida’s most basic thoughts on language.  For Derrida, as we 
have seen, language is inescapably idiomatic, which is to say that communication is always a matter 
of language-users translating the personal and therefore untranslatable idioms of others.  In 
Derrida’s view, this “idiomacity” serves to up the stakes of interpretive care, deepening our 
responsibility toward the “Other” by disabling any hope of its discharge (i.e. by making it a 
“responsibility without limit”401) or fulfillment.  Balkin’s mistake is that he follows Derrida’s 
idiomacity thesis to the opposite conclusion, assuming that interpretive/interpersonal responsibility 
dies along with the possibility of atomic communication.  And with this, Balkin assumes his own 
license – supposedly granted by Derrida himself – for interpretive “selectvity”402 and 
“alteration”403:
“In explaining Derrida’s practices to a legal audience, I will focus on those areas of his work 
that have most relevance to legal writing and thought.  This... requires selection, editorial 
judgment, and reinterpretation…”404
                                               
396 See Pierre Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi: The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction” 
(11 Cardozo Law Review 1989 – 1990) p.1631 – Hereafter referenced as “Schlag”
397 Jack Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” (Faculty Scholarship Series, 1987) at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/291 – Hereafter referenced as “Balkin”
398 Jack Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career” (Vol.27:2 Cardozo Law Review 2005) p.720 – Hereafter referenced as 
“Deconstruction’s Legal Career”
399 See Balkin, p.2
400 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Oxford Paperbacks, 2008)
401 See Jack Balkin, “Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice” (92 Michigan Law Review 1994) p.1153 –
Hereafter referenced as “Transcendental Deconstruction”
402 “Deconstruction’s Legal Career” p.722
403 Balkin, p.4
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This enables Balkin to follow a frustratingly narrow line of analysis, and to define deconstruction –
in opposition to Derrida’s many claims to the contrary405 – as “an analytic tool”406; a formalistic and 
non-ethical407 practice which involves little more than the “identification of hierarchical 
oppositions, followed by a temporary reversal of the hierarchy”408 as a means of intellectual 
revelation.  On the one hand, this is a fairly accurate definition of the CLS brand of 
deconstruction(ism) which was already “viral”409 within legal circles.  On the other hand, Balkin’s 
own mission statement – to go about “explaining Derrida’s [my emphasis] practices to a legal 
audience”410 – seems to clarify his intent to start afresh; to “bracket”411 out the CLS appropriation 
and return to Derrida for the answers which his appropriators always seemed to skim over in 
haste.412  Two questions stand out in this respect:
1. What is deconstruction?  And;
2. Is there any space for talking about or using deconstruction in the context of legal 
theory/interpretation?
These questions are, of course, the same ones to which this thesis is a response, and my interest in 
Balkin – as the first (Anglo-American) legal theorist to confront them directly/in-depth – is 
therefore unsurprising.  But despite his resolve to start afresh, Balkin’s account (as suggested 
above) ends up looking more like a reflection of the CLS appropriation than a renewed 
confrontation with Derrida.  And the problem with this, as I shall now argue, is that the CLS 
appropriation – at least insofar we might suppose its fidelity to Derrida’s texts and theories – is a 
misfire, specifically on account of its very un-Derridean emphasis on the formal/technical moves of 
works like the Grammatology.  To explain this point, let us now take a closer look at Balkin’s
repetition.
                                               
405 Most notably: “Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one.  Especially if the technical and 
procedural significations of the word are stressed.  It is true that in certain circles (university or cultural, especially in 
the United States) the technical and methodological ‘metaphor’ that seems necessarily attached to the word 
deconstruction has been able to seduce or lead astray.  Hence the debate that has developed in these circles: can 
deconstruction become a methodology for reading and for interpretation?” – See “Letter to a Japanese Friend” p.3
406 Balkin, p.48
407 “deconstructive techniques… have no necessary ethical stance… it is easy enough to produce deconstructive 
arguments for both sides of any policy question” – See “Deconstruction’s Legal Career” p.738
408 Balkin, p.5
409 Pierre Schlag, “A Brief Survey of Deconstruction” (Vol.27:2 Cardozo Law Review 2005) p.745
410 Balkin, p.4
411 By which I mean to reference Husserl’s phenomenological method – a major influence of Derrida’s own thought.  
See, for example, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/ (the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Husserl)
412 “[CLS scholars] assumed pretty much without question [my emphasis] that they could adapt deconstructive 
techniques to critique unjust legal doctrines” – See “Deconstruction’s Legal Career” p.720
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Madness Before Method:
“Deconstruction is not a method... or... a set of rules and transposable procedures…”413
Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend”
The question over the supposedly non-methodological character of deconstruction has been given 
many a cold shoulder over the years – especially by theorists on an “interdisciplinary mission”414
(i.e. those hoping “to ‘apply’ deconstruction”415 to seemingly fresh fields of study).  Balkin follows 
suit:
“Derrida and his followers have always insisted that deconstruction is not a method, and that 
it cannot be reduced to a set of techniques.  But this assertion is undermined by their actual 
practices of reading and argument.  After all, if deconstruction was to be perpetuated in the 
next generation of graduate students, these students had to learn how to do it, and this meant 
that there had to be some set of skills that could be transmitted from teacher to pupil…”416
Several points are worth flagging here.  First of all, Balkin’s shoulder isn’t completely cold, which 
is to say that he is at least trying to engage with Derrida’s warning directly.  Second-off, Balkin is 
(somewhat) rightly mindful of the tension between this warning and the tenacious recurrence of 
certain “repeatable and teachable”417 techniques in Derrida’s work (e.g. “the inversion of 
hierarchies”418).  But from here, we run into trouble.  “Graduate students... had to learn how to do” 
deconstruction, he says.  Why did they have to?  And on what grounds can we say that 
deconstruction is something which can be done? 419  These questions are especially pressing since 
Derrida has been so explicit in saying otherwise.  For example, apart from the “Japanese Friend” 
quote above we might refer back to one of the conclusive quotes of my first chapter: “I am not 
asking them [i.e. the new philosophers/deconstructionists] to be like me”420 – does this not already 
hint at a more Wittgensteinian “spirit”421 of deconstruction, one which values the openness of 
inspiration over the repressiveness of flat instruction?
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414 Schlag, p.1651
415 ibid
416 “Deconstruction’s Legal Career” p.722
417 ibid
418 Balkin, p.5
419 As I have claimed already, Derrida always refused such estimations: “deconstruction... does not await the 
deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject” – See “Letter to a Japanese Friend” p.4
420 The Politics of Friendship, p.42
421 This is a reference to Wittgenstein’s wish that his work would “stimulate” the thoughts of others, not turn them into 
blind disciples.  See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) p.4
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To make this point clearer, we can return to the “first aporia”422 of justice in Derrida’s Cardozo text.  
There is no justice, says Derrida, in the computerized application of a rule, which means that 
deconstruction – since it “is justice”423 – cannot simply be a matter of applying fixed rules or 
techniques (i.e. of “following a rule”424).  But to give a thorough explanation of this, we could go 
back even further, perhaps even all the way back to Derrida’s inaugural use of the word 
“deconstruction” in the Grammatology:
“The ‘rationality’... which governs a writing thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer issues 
from a logos.  Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the 
de-sedimentation [my emphasis], the de-construction, of all the significations that have their 
source in that of the logos... particularly the signification of truth.”425
I have emphasized the word “de-sedimentation” here because, as a non-symmetrical rival to 
deconstruction, it brings us – even in its most colloquial guise – so much closer to the anti-
methodological character of its stablemate.  To explain: sedimentation appears in nature as a 
consequence of river-flow, which is to say that it occurs as a (dare I say) natural happening rather 
than a subjectively-induced performance.  The flowing river picks up and deposits material.  Picks 
up and deposits.  In other words, it must de-sediment (i.e. loosen and collect) for sedimentation to 
be possible.  In conceptual terms, the river – the very metaphor which Heraclitus used for his 
philosophy of the “flux”426 – represents Derrida’s différance: the condition which ensures the 
aporetic simultaneity of metaphysics (i.e. sedimentation) and deconstruction/de-sedimentation.  
Deconstruction then, as de-sedimentation, is all about reminding ourselves that structures (truths, 
meanings, conventions, etc.) are merely incidental deposits which can just as easily be given back 
up to the “flux” from whence they came.  And this means that nothing – not even a purposively 
anti-stasis “technique”427– is any more secure from being sent back into motion than any other, 
which is to say that Derrida’s attempted affirmation of différance (i.e. as arkhe) can only retain its 
integrity by divorcing itself from every-thing; by following up every instance of unavoidable 
sedimentation with a fresh burst of “foundational”428 scrutiny.
                                               
422 “Force of Law” p.961
423 ibid, p.945
424 ibid, p.961
425 OG, p.10
426 See, for example, Radical Hermeneutics, p.2
427 Balkin, p.2
428 In this sense, we might liken the self-reflexive character of Derrida’s thought to the most radical and relentless form 
of Cartesian skepticism.  See Rene Descartres, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
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As damning as it may seem, we should not count Balkin out on this point alone.  On the contrary: 
we now have to ask whether, in the most pragmatic sense, Balkin’s method-specific version of 
deconstruction might still be valued as the best available means of turning Derrida into an 
influential legal theorist.  Leaving aside (for now) the question of whether this remains desirable in 
light of my notes above, we can suggest at least two senses of pragmatic worth behind Balkin’s 
approach:
1. It’s “revelatory”429 potential:  If deconstruction is fundamentally against methodological 
rigidity (if it is, to quote Paul de Man, a “resistance to theory”430) then we might ask why (and 
by what justification) Derrida constantly relies on the same revelatory procedures?  The answer, 
I think, is that they are the best way – in Derrida’s eyes, and pending the discoveries “of the 
future”431 – of opening up a text to its ghosts.  In other words, perhaps Balkin is not 
misinterpreting Derrida’s stance so much as he is realizing that, from a purely practical 
perspective, he needs a set of effective and proven tools (i.e. like Derrida’s) through which to 
instigate deconstructive liberation.
2. It’s capacity to overcome institutional resistance:  As Pierre Schlag notes, “legal thinkers will 
often be annoyed and... react dismissively”432 when things get too airy-fairy or philosophical.  
Derrida – given his mysticism, his preoccupation with aporia, his obscure and technical 
vocabulary, etc. – is a prime candidate for this sort of knee-jerk resistance, which means that his 
work is unlikely to have a meaningful (i.e. widespread/lasting) influence on the legal 
community unless it is carefully marketed.  And for me, the most obvious marketing strategy to 
this end would surely look something like Balkin’s – one which highlights and plays-off the 
more procedural/formal (i.e. conventionally legal) lines within Derrida’s work.
Now: Derrida was always quick to emphasize the ever-pressing need for pragmatic trade-offs and 
sacrifices; for metaphysical economies, as I called them earlier.  However, the trade-offs suggested 
above – as persuasive as they may be – are, for me, not quite enough to justify Balkin’s highly 
selective “formalization”433 of deconstruction.  There are two reasons for this:
                                               
429 Balkin, p.48
430 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (University of Minnesota Press, 1986) – also, for a summary of some of de 
Man’s key arguments regarding deconstruction/Derrida in this book, see Christopher Norris, “Law, Deconstruction, and 
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1. Although Balkin’s version of deconstruction does possess a certain revelatory/de-sedimenting 
power in itself, this power can always be abused to serve the pre-determined preferences of a 
given interpreter.  To explain: if deconstruction is purely (or primarily) technical, then it is 
solely (or primarily) a matter of which steps the interpreter follows.  This, of course, stands in 
direct opposition to my claim that deconstruction is all about undertaking an ethical quest to 
“see things from the Other’s”434 perspective, since we can deliberately shut out the “Other” (e.g. 
by using so-called “deconstructive techniques”435 to undermine an interpretation to which we 
are politically/morally opposed) while maintaining the utmost fidelity to Balkin’s proposed 
methodology.  And since (as I said in chapter two) it is the moral/ethical character of 
deconstruction which makes it so worthwhile, the de-moralization which comes with Balkin’s 
subordination of mindset (i.e. the apsirational desire for raw hospitality) to method is also the 
de-valuation and de-necessitation of deconstruction itself.
2. To quote Pierre Schlag, “the risk [with Balkin’s approach] is that, at the very moment that 
deconstruction is making its entry into the law, the legal thinker will once again situate his self 
outside the reach of deconstruction”436 by folding deconstruction cosily into the “self-indulgent 
traditional discourse”437 of law.  In other words, when Balkin assumes that “deconstruction 
must... be altered, changed… [and] modified”438 to meet the “needs and concerns of the legal 
academy”439 he is effectively instituting a “violent hierarchy”440 in which law is privileged and 
protected against the foreign influx of extra-legal theories like deconstruction.  The negative 
effects of this are at least twofold.  First off, it de-radicalizes deconstruction (i.e. disrupts its 
quest from ethical openness) by creating an out-of-bounds shelter for the dearest assumptions of 
legal discourse; by assuming that law is a thoroughly stable institution which can subsume 
deconstruction as “just another... objectified resource-field for legal arguments.”441  Second-off, 
it disconnects us from the fuller implications of Derrida’s work as a philosophy and as the basis 
of an all englobing super-system, the result of which is that we will be more prone to 
misunderstanding Derrida – even in terms of his more basic proclamations – because we are 
encountering him so far out of context.
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The last few pages, by swinging from anti- to pro- to anti-Balkin, give us a good sense of the 
theoretical tightroping required to turn Derrida into an influential legal theorist.  In many ways, our 
task is really to find an Aristotelian “mean”442 between two modes of integrative failure, and Schlag 
– whose approach is evidently something of a kindred spirit to my own here – sums up these modes 
in a passage which I can hardly avoid quoting:
If engagement of the traditional discourse describes the project of deconstruction, then 
deconstruction can fail in (at least) two ways.  First, deconstruction can fail because it 
becomes too challenging, too heretical, too much of a departure from accepted discursive 
practices.  In this case, deconstruction can fail because the traditional discourse will identify 
and marginalize deconstruction as unintelligible, as absurd, as beyond the pale.  
Deconstruction, however, can also fail in a second and perhaps more interesting manner... [it] 
can fail to engage if it becomes subsumed and co-opted by the categorical regimes of 
traditional legal discourse...”443
For me, it is the latter mode (“failure by cooptation”444 as Schlag puts it, Balkin’s failure as I see it) 
which we should be most guarded against.  There are, once again, two reasons for this.  The first is 
that deconstruction will always – even in its most diluted and simplistic form – inflame the anti-
philosophical impatience of most lawyers, which is to say that its integration will always fail, at 
least to some extent, on the grounds of its beyond-the-paleness.  The second is that, even if we 
could downplay this beyond-the-paleness to the point where deconstruction really could have a 
“widespread/lasting” influence on the legal profession, we could not do so (in my opinion) without 
simultaneously killing deconstruction; without robbing it, as a vital point, of the radical ethics of 
beyond-the-paleness which makes it so necessary/valuable as a legal phenomenon.  Sure, we might 
have achieved integration, but of what?  Deconstruction?  Or a toothless and therefore pointless 
substitute?
                                               
442 See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996)
443 Schlag, p.1636
444 ibid
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Doing Justice to Derrida’s Justice:
“the encounter between deconstruction and justice... changed both parties”445
Jack Balkin, “Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice”
The ethical poverty of Balkin’s techno-formal deconstruction was, of course, fundamentally 
undermined a mere three years later by Derrida’s own declaration that deconstruction is not only 
ethical in character but “is justice” itself.  Balkin’s response to this is fascinating, because rather 
than caving under the weight of Derrida’s paternal authority, he sticks to his guns, even being so 
bold as to suggest that he had “improved”446 deconstruction by tailoring it – transformationally –
“to the critical study of law”447 and to the practical business of producing just results even if there 
was nothing necessarily “just”448 about deconstruction (i.e. as a method) itself.  In a sense, Balkin’s 
willingness to walk his own path – to disregard the wishes of his theoretical “father”449 figure – is 
very much in keeping with the anti-authoritarian “spirit” of deconstruction.  The problem is, Balkin 
only manages to disregard Derrida’s authority by misinterpreting the key terms of his Cardozo
address, and specifically by missing the gap between the more colloquial connotations of the word 
“justice” and the “quasi-transcendental” sense in which Derrida uses it.  Consider the following 
passage by way of example:
“[According to Derrida]... deconstruction leads to justice because it reveals the limitlessness 
of our responsibility.  Nevertheless, a responsibility without limits is not the same thing as 
justice.  We do not necessarily increase justice by increasing responsibility.  Suppose a 
plaintiff is injured in a traffic accident.  The plaintiff picks a name at random from the phone 
directory and sues this person as a defendant.  We do not necessarily increase justice by 
holding this person liable for the accident.  Justice… [on the contrary] is increased by 
eliminating her responsibility... the demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the 
demand for increased responsibility.  It is rather the demand for an appropriate apportionment 
of responsibility.  This is what ‘just’ means – neither too much nor too little, but just the right 
amount of responsibility for each person…”450
                                               
445 “Transcendental Deconstruction” p.1196
446 ibid, p.1132
447 ibid
448 “...deconstruction itself does not have a politics, or rather it has only the politics of those who make use [my 
emphasis] of it... and deconstruction itself is not just, although it may be used to pursue justice” – See Jack Balkin, 
“Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction” (11 Cardozo Law Review 1989 – 1990) p.1623
449 See, for example, Derrida’s obituary in the New York Times –
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/10/obituaries/10derrida.html
450 “Transcendental Deconstruction” pp.1153 – 1154
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Balkin’s mistake here – and this goes back to my header quote on the previous page – lies in his 
assumption that the word “justice” stands only for the sense of “appropriate apportionment” which 
was initially given it by Aristotle, and that, therefore, when Derrida relates deconstruction to justice, 
he must be confronting this Aristotelian conception as an external invader.  If this was the case, then 
yes, the results would be a little absurd.  But as per my second chapter, Derrida’s conception of 
justice only relates to the Aristotelian conception insofar as it interrupts and suspends it, which is to 
say that it occupies a space prior to or above the necessity of apportionment.  This means that what 
Balkin calls the “encounter between deconstruction and justice” is nothing of the sort, but rather a 
disinterment of the extra-ordinary justice which had always lived within the concept of 
deconstruction and which sets itself apart from the unavoidable repressiveness of general, 
metaphysical moralities.
For me, this mistake – in all its gravity – is but one manifestation of the mistake, the failure, which 
infects and skews Balkin’s reading from the start.  To put it simply: Balkin never gives himself up 
to the “spirit” of deconstruction, which is to say that he keeps his eyes closed, wired-shut even, to 
the freshness and counter-colloquialism of Derrida’s texts.  This is why he misses the in-built 
“ethics of deconstruction” – because he is so firmly wired into the justice-as-desert formula, and 
because he thoughtlessly imports it into Derrida’s ethics as a point of self-evidence; a proper 
“kernel” of meaning.  And yet, what else is deconstruction for – as a technique or as a “spirit” –
except the cutting of these wires?  Here we have Balkin’s unforgiveable mistake: the failure to (try
and) cut his own wires; to shake himself free of the conventional and the received and experience 
something (i.e. something fresh, an event) in Derrida’s texts.
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SECTION II: DUNCAN KENNEDY’S DECONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVISM:
Although I have suggested that Balkin’s selective legalization of deconstruction reflects (and 
repeats) an almost endemic misappropriation by CLS scholars, there is a sense in which one such 
scholar – Duncan Kennedy – might be able to shake the charges.  To the familiar reader, this may 
seem like a bit of a stretch, not least because of Kennedy’s reliance on a seemingly step-based mode 
of “critique”451 which is strikingly similar to Balkin’s deconstruction:
“There are four steps to follow as one gets ready to do some critical theory within law... First: 
identify a distinction [my emphasis] that drives you crazy... Second: find in each half of the 
distinction the things, traits, aspects, qualities, characteristics, or whatever that were supposed 
to be located in the other half, and vice versa.  This is the move classically called chiasmus, 
and practiced most notably and repetitively by Marx and then by Derrida... in Of 
Grammatology... Third: put the question whether the distinction you have just destabilized 
corresponds to a real division in reality on hold... and instead try to figure out why the people 
who use the distinction work so hard to maintain belief in it in the face of their own doubts... 
Fourth: trace the consequences of the distinction...”452
In a number of early essays (e.g. “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication”453 and “The 
Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries”454) Kennedy uses precisely this sort of 
“deconstructive”455 or critical analysis to undermine the idea of an “empirical, value-neutral”456
approach to legal interpretation.  Of course, legal realists had already presented cogent arguments 
for such a conclusion, but Kennedy took things a step further by suggesting that judicial resolutions 
of formal/structural conflict within the law should be understood as artificial resolutions of a deeper 
and ultimately “inescapable [i.e. irresolvable] conflict between... individualist and communal 
values”457 within Western systems.  In other words, legal decisions are pre-determined (for 
Kennedy) by deep but basically arbitrary (i.e. rationally unjustifiable) value choices, which is to say 
that they can always be undermined – or deconstructed, as Balkin would have it – by a willing and 
perceptive interpreter.
                                               
451 See Duncan Kennedy, “A Semiotics of Critique” (22 Cardozo Law Review 2001)
452 ibid, p.1189
453 Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (89 Harvard Law Review 1976) pp.1685 –
1778 (Hereafter referenced as “Form and Substance”)
454 Duncan Kennedy, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (28 Buffalo Law Review 1979) pp.205 – 382
455 By which I mean “deconstructive” in the formal/technical sense of Balkin’s account.
456 Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton University Press, 1990) p.109
457 Law as Sacrifice, p.152
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Although this line – especially when coupled with the claim that legal “critique” is merely a matter 
of following certain pre-set “steps” – seems to place Kennedy firmly within the circle of CLS mis-
users, I want to argue that it can actually (and should actually) be read “as dictum”458 against an 
overriding “spirit” within Kennedy’s work: one which emphasizes de-reification and self-reflexivity 
above every indication to the contrary.  As Pierre Schlag puts it:
“Kennedy has an absolute horror of reification - most particularly the reification of his own 
thought.  Indeed, Kennedy strives valiantly to subvert the reification of his own thinking.  
Reading his work, it is hard to avoid the sense that he prefers motion to stasis, verbs to nouns, 
Sartre to Levi-Strauss, engagement to theory, contradiction to coherence and... politics 
to law”459
This “horror of reification” is not just a wariness of the “bodysnatchers”460 (i.e. those who 
carelessly quote other theorists to reap “some surface legitimacy”461 for their own projects) – it is 
also the product of Kennedy’s deep-set belief that philosophy is a sort of subversion in itself,
specifically in the sense that it tends to rationalize and quantify that which cannot be rationalized or 
quantified: the wild, unfiltered “experience”462 which precedes philosophy as its unattainable 
object.  We should recognize this type of anti-Hegelian/anti-authoritarian attitude from my notes on 
Derrida, and it is therefore unsurprising that Kennedy is every bit as prone to hyper-Cartesianism 
(i.e. fearless self-reflexion) as he is.  In fact, these tendencies run so deep in Kennedy’s work that, 
in an oft-cited dialogue with Peter Gabel, he went so far as to abruptly “renounce”463 his most 
influential analyses on the grounds that their subsequent “turned-into-podness”464 (i.e. 
reification/distortion) had made them counter-productive in terms of their capacity to bring about 
genuine, intra-systematic change.  This is what matters for Kennedy: not veridicality but 
productivity – “verbs [and] engagement.”465  And with this in mind, we can propose the following 
section-goal: to explain how the above attitude manifests itself in Kennedy’s positive prescriptions, 
and to consider the spirited “deconstructive-ness” of these prescriptions.  Let us proceed.
                                               
458 Motoaki Funakoshi, “Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously” (15 Widener Law Review 2009) p.238
459 Pierre Schlag, “Politics and Denial” (22 Cardozo Law Review 2000 – 2001) p.1135
460 “the bodysnatchers are always nearby, and you wake up and... the whole conceptual structure has been turned into a 
cluster of pods” – See Duncan Kennedy & Peter Gabel, “Roll Over Beethoven” (36 Stanford Law Review 1984) p.7 –
Hereafter referenced as “Roll Over Beethoven”
461 ibid, p.16
462 “I don’t want to construct a philosophy... I do want to talk about… experience” – ibid, p.6
463 “I renounce the fundamental contradiction.  I recant it, and I also recant the whole idea of individualism and 
altruism… these things are absolutely classic examples of philosophical abstractions which you can manipulate into 
little structures…” – ibid, p.15… 16
464 A reference to the film, The Invasion of the Bodysnatchers – see ibid, p.38 & p.54 (the latter for a brief explanation)
465 Kennedy’s work is largely based on the pursuit of his “own brand of oppositional or opportunistic politics” – see 
Joanne Conaghan, “Wishful Thinking of Bad Faith” (22 Cardozo Law Review 2000 – 2001) p.722
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Kennedy’s Existentialist Ethics of Action:
“When we ask about the way these primary choices are made and our deep premises adopted, the 
answer is simple: through authentic action justified by an existentialist choice”466
Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence
The best place to start with Kennedy, for me, is his reliance on Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism – a 
philosophy which “implies an ethics”467 in the same anti-authoritarian vein as Derrida’s.  In its most 
basic sense, Sartre’s ethics “requires that one never relinquish the [absolute] liberty”468 of self-
determination.  Such relinquishment – which Sartre refers to as “bad faith”469 – occurs when an 
individual comes to recognize a “specific role”470 (e.g. mother/Jew/“waiter in a cafe”471) as more 
constitutive of their selfhood than their ability to transcend that role.  This isn’t to deny the 
“factical”472 inevitability of role adoption, and it isn’t to suggest that role-adoption is a bad thing in 
itself.  Rather, Sartre’s objection is against our coming to see a particular role as an immoveable and 
definitive component of our Being – a belief which Sartre criticizes for its denial of:
1. Our retained ability to act outside of our role (i.e. our freedom) and;
2. Our personal responsibility for our role-related actions as far as they are freely chosen;
In a sense, Kennedy’s prescriptive theory of adjudication – perhaps best displayed in “Freedom and 
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology”473 and A Critique of Adjudication474 –
entails little more than a direct imposition of Sartre’s ethical standards upon the judge.  And for me, 
the directness of this imposition is at its most readily identifiable in the following excerpt from one 
of Kennedy’s earliest (and most influential) texts:
                                               
466 Costas Douzinas & Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 2005) p.235
467 Law as Sacrifice, p.155
468 ibid
469 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Simon & Schuster, 1993) pp.86 – 118
470 Law as Sacrifice, p.155
471 This is probably Sartre’s most famous example of an individual in bad faith: “He applies himself to chaining his 
movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other... he is playing... but what is he playing?  We need 
not watch long before we can explain it; he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe” – See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and 
Nothingness (Simon & Schuster, 1993) pp.101 – 102
472 Radical Hermeneutics, p.1
473 Duncan Kennedy, “Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology” (36 Journal of Legal 
Education 1986) pp.518 – 562 – Hereafter referenced as “Freedom and Constraint”
474 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press, 1997) – Hereafter referenced as “A Critique 
of Adjudication”
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“...an instrumental theory of judging lies to the judge himself, telling him that he has two 
kinds of existence.  He is a private citizen, a subject, a cluster of ends consuming the world.  
And he is an official, an object, a service consumed by private parties.  As an instrument, the 
judge is not implicated in the legislature’s exercise of force through him.  Only when he 
chooses to make his own rules, rather than blindly apply those given to him, must he take 
moral responsibility... By contrast, altruism denies the judge the right to apply rules without 
looking over his shoulder at the results... [the judge] must accept that his official life is 
personal…”475
Kennedy’s line here is straightforward.  The judge who sees himself “as an instrument” is lying to 
himself in the sense that he does not actually become robotized or automatized in the supposed 
transition from personal to official life.  And this means that, when a judge blindly applies a law 
which he feels to be abhorrent, or which he feels to be purposively ill-suited to the circumstances of 
the case at hand, he does not do so because he is role-bound, but because he has chosen to be role-
bound, because he has chosen a commitment to the rule-of-law (in some sense or another) above all 
else.  This then, is where Kennedy’s notion of “bad faith” kicks in – at the point where the judge 
denies his freedom and passes the buck of responsibility to the legislature.
So: by Kennedy’s account, judges should only make decisions for which they are willing to accept 
personal, ethical responsibility; as if they were the sole member of a fairly marginal legislature.  
Sometimes – when the judge’s “impression of the law”476 seems to coincide with what Kennedy 
calls his “sense of how-I-want-to-come-out”477 (his “HIWTCO”478 for short) – this will be easy.  At 
other times – when the judge’s initial perception of the law has to be “worked and shaped”479 to 
align it with his “HIWTCO” – it will be difficult.  And sometimes, no amount of “work”480 (i.e. no 
amount of “resourceful legal argument”481) will get the job done, which is to say that the judge will 
run out of the “time and energy”482 which he needs to persuasively justify his preference.  The 
question is, has the existentialist judge (i.e. the judge striving to avoid “bad faith”; the responsible, 
non-robotic judge) reached an impasse with this last scenario, or is he still ethically obliged to 
follow his “HIWTCO”?
                                               
475 “Form and Substance” pp.1772 – 1773
476 “Freedom and Constraint” p.519
477 ibid
478 Law as Sacrifice, p.191
479 Costas Douzinas & Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 2005) p.234; Kennedy actually uses a 
strikingly similar metaphor when describes the law as “a mass of wet clay that two opposing potters [i.e. legal teams] 
are each trying to shape before it hardens” – see “Freedom and Constraint” p.526
480 “legal reasoning is a kind of work with a purpose” – see “Freedom and Constraint” p.526
481 Law as Sacrifice, p.195
482 “Freedom and Constraint” p.528
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Kennedy’s answer is a little unclear, not least because it comes in an article (i.e. “Freedom and 
Constraint”) where he speaks through a pseudo-fictional “judge-self”483 rather than as the “Duncan 
Kennedy we have come to know”484 through his academic work.  However, there is at least one 
very telling moment in the closing pages of “Freedom and Constraint” when Kennedy – still 
speaking in the voice of his “judge-self” – complains of how “terrible”485 he will feel regardless of 
whether he follows an apparently “unbudgeable”486 law or a conflicting sense of preference.  For 
me, this remark, as brief and passing as it may seem, actually represents the moment when Kennedy 
drops his mask and reveals (or at least hints at) his real position. In particular, it suggests that:
1. Kennedy is an existentialist-to-the-end.  To explain: his “judge-self” might feel bound by a 
certain “felt objectivity”487 of the rule, but if he really believed this, deep down, then he would 
have nothing to feel “terrible” about.  We feel terrible when we feel responsible, which is to say 
that Kennedy’s “judge-self” still sees an open choice before him, even if that choice is buried in 
his subconscious to the point where he only feels it (i.e. without quite seeing it) as a vague sense 
of deflation.
2. Kennedy sees the indissoluble freedom of adjudication as a potentially tragic asset – hence the 
inevitability of his “terrible” feeling to come.  If we look back to the start of his article, we can, I 
think, identify the poles of this tragedy as the “two objectives”488 of Kennedy’s fictitious judge.  
On the one hand, the presiding judge can pursue the short-term objective of reaching his 
present-case preference – but if he is too gung-ho in this pursuit (i.e. if he sticks with it even 
when the law seems plainly against him) he risks an avalanche of negative consequences (e.g. 
public disapproval, having his decision overturned or ignored, etc.489) which may damage his 
power of influence and, in turn, his ability to pursue any longer-term “law-reform”490 objective.  
On the other hand, if the judge prioritizes this objective (i.e. the longer-term one) he may – on 
the basis of the consequential constraints described above, and specifically in the case of an 
apparent conflict between law and preference – end up turning his back on the needs and deserts 
of the real lives before him, thereby negating the moral drive of his short-term goal.
                                               
483 To be more precise: a “liberal activist judge-self [who] pursues social justice” – ibid, p.527
484 Law as Sacrifice, p.192
485 “Freedom and Constraint” p.557
486 ibid, p.561
487 ibid, p.560
488 ibid, p.521
489 For a fuller account of these consequences, see ibid, pp.527 – 528
490 In other words, one which seeks to “move the law as much as possible” in the judge’s preferred direction – see ibid, 
p.522
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Kennedy’s position then, is something like this: judges should use the law – which is to say that 
they should use its doctrinal “manipulatability”491 – to produce just outcomes; those which appear 
(on the balance of the various consequences/benefits involved) to be most in-tune with their 
personal sense of justice.  In addition, the anti-authoritarian-ness which animates this prescription 
spills over into Kennedy’s own, personal belief regarding the justness of legal outcomes:
“I see myself as a political activist, someone with the ‘vocation of social transformation’ as 
Roberto Unger put it.  I see the set of rules in force as chosen by the people who had the 
power to make choices in accordance with their views on morality and justice and their own 
self-interest.  And I see the rules as remaining in force because victimized groups have not 
had the political vision and energy and raw power to change them.  I see myself as a focus of 
political energy for change in an egalitarian, communitarian, decentralized, democratic 
socialist direction…”492
We should not underestimate the importance of this paragraph.  In fact, we should keep it right at 
the front of our minds, because it is – as we will see – crucial to assessing Kennedy’s status as a 
deconstructionist.  Let us now turn to this assessment; considering Kennedy’s relation to the “spirit” 
of deconstruction on a detailed, point-by-point basis.
                                               
491 Motoaki Funakoshi, “Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously” (15 Widener Law Review 2009) p.247
492 “Freedom and Constraint” p.521
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Kennedy as a Deconstructionist, Point-by-Point:
 As Pierre Schlag notes, Kennedy’s anti-authoritarianism – one of the most notable links 
between his ethics of “authenticity”493 and Derrida’s ethics of deconstruction – is limited by a 
seemingly arbitrary hierarchization of authorit(ies); an ordering whereby some forms of role-
subsumption are presumed to be more authentic (i.e. less worthy of the “bad faith” label) than 
others.
 To explain the above point: Kennedy is vehemently opposed to judges who see themselves as 
legislative instruments, but he supports those who see themselves as instruments of their own 
de-formalized sense of justice.  The trouble is, if the measure of an individual’s “bad faith” lies 
in the extent to which he has syphoned off his free potentiality to an external sovereign, then 
surely both sets of judges – by declaring their instrumentality at all – are equally guilty of it. 
 However, Kennedy is far too wily to miss this point, and in A Critique of Adjudication – the site 
of his most unabashed reliance on Sartre – Kennedy reworks (or perhaps simply clarifies) his 
position by suggesting that a judge who is stubbornly committed to an abstract political project 
(e.g. along a set of party lines) is just as guilty of “bad faith” as one who presumes his 
unshakeable subservience to the legislature.
 This leaves us with something like the following prescription: judges should, as far as possible, 
make decisions on the basis of their honest and case-specific preferences; not under the 
authoritative weight of a (personal or official) project.  Apart from restricting the judge’s 
existential freedom, such projects – “universalization projects”494 as Kennedy calls them – are 
also extra-personally reductive, which is to say that they subordinate the singular, non-
generalizable needs of litigants (i.e. the sense in which the “case-[is]-specific”495) against some 
self-assured notion of a greater good.
                                               
493 By which I mean to reference the Heideggerian concept which is so much akin to Sartre’s notion of “bad faith” –
See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Wiley-Blackwell, 1978) p.220
494 See, for example, A Critique of Adjudication, p.43
495 Kennedy is just as mindful of this problem in his early work.  Consider the following quote: “I believe that there is 
value as well as an element of real nobility in the judicial decision to throw out, every time the opportunity arises, 
consumer contracts designed to perpetuate the exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit.  Real people are 
involved, even if there are not very many whose lives the decision can affect.  The altruist judge can view himself as a 
resource whose effectiveness in the cause of substantive justice is to be maximized, but to adopt this attitude is to 
abandon the crucial proposition that altruistic duty is owed by one individual to another, without the interposition of the 
general category of humanity [my emphasis]” (“Form and Substance” p.1777) - Perhaps this sense of connection 
“without... interposition” is equivalent to what Kennedy would later call “intersubjective zap” (“Roll Over Beethoven” 
p.10): “a vitalizing moment of energy... when the barriers between the self and the other are in some sense suddenly 
dissolved... [not in the sense of] reflective understanding” (“Roll Over Beethoven” p.54)
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 Now: on the upside, this prescription does seem to get the judge out of “Sartrean bad faith”496 –
at least in the sense that a “case-specific” preference will ensure the judge’s perpetual 
reinvention or modification of his (unavoidable) “life-project.”497  However, my aim is not to 
rate Kennedy as a Sartean, but as a Derridean.  And from this perspective, we can reignite 
Schlag’s initial criticism in the sense that every preference – including the most tentative, “case-
specific” ones – will “predestine”498 the judge’s decision in a way which kills Derrida’s moral 
quest for openness; for the abyssal “madness”499 of the decision.
 The question then, is whether we can apply the deconstructionist label to a thinker who is so 
vocal, from the very start, in advising against the pursuit of the litigative “perhaps” (i.e. the 
moment in which both parties have a fighting chance) to which Derrida’s “Force of Law” 
points.
 In forming a response to this question, we must first note the character of Kennedy’s deviation 
from Derrida.  I have already suggested (in the fourth point of this sequence) that Kennedy is 
concerned by attitudes which “objectify humanity and reduce it”500 to a homogeneous essence; 
what we might call “universalizing” attitudes.  Moreover, Kennedy believes (at least by the time 
of his Critique of Adjudication501) that there is no meaningful possibility of escaping such 
attitudes on a personal level, which is to say that we can never quite experience the 
intersubjective “connectedness”502 (i.e. “zap”503) of which he speaks elsewhere.
 These concerns are also – as should be all too clear – the lifeblood of Derrida’s ethics, with 
Kennedy’s unattainable “zap” serving as a symmetrical stand-in for concepts like 
“unconditional” hospitality and the gift-without-reserve.  In other words, there is no palpable 
break from Derrida on the level of Kennedy’s ethical concern, which suggests (surely) that the 
break is exclusively determinable in terms of action.
                                               
496 A Critique of Adjudication, p.56
497 “I already have, as part of my life as I’ve lived it up to this moment, a set of intentions, a life-project as a judge, that 
will orient me among the many possible attitudes I could take to this work” – See “Freedom and Constraint” p.521
498 Cf. Jacques Derrida, The Postcard (University of Chicago Press, 1987) p.4 – “I can foresee the impatience of the bad 
reader...the fearful reader, the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon deciding... it is bad to predestine one’s 
reading, it is always bad to foretell [my emphasis]…”
499 A “madness” which, in its wildest form, would require the judge to do the impossible: to turn his back on both rule 
and preference, and to affirm a freedom more radical than the existential freedom of which Kennedy speaks – a freedom 
of the abyss.
500 Law as Sacrifice, p.157
501 As Johan van der Walt puts it, Kennedy’s Critique “is post-zap... in the sense of a loss of faith in the existence or 
possibility of zap” – See Law as Sacrifice, pp.161 – 162
502 Cf. “Roll Over Beethoven” p.54 – “a sudden, intuitive moment of connectedness… a vitalizing moment of energy… 
when the barriers between the self and the other are in some sense suddenly dissolved…”
503 ibid, p.10
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 To pre-orient an explanation of this break, we could mark out a certain (pivotal) distinction 
between two forms of Kennedy’s anti-authoritarianism: one existential and one socio-political.  
The existential comprises Kennedy’s distrust of the judge’s self-perceived unfreedom – a 
distrust which (as we have seen) stops short of the radical openness proffered by Derrida.  The 
socio-political, on the other hand, comprises Kennedy’s own penchant for democratic socialism; 
his deep-set desire for the liberation and mobilization of the various “silenced, suppressed… 
[and] forgotten”504 voices in society.
 Far from enjoying a peaceful coexistence, these forms are mutually antagonistic in the sense 
that a die-hard commitment to one will likely jeopardize the pursuit of the other.  This means 
that, when Kennedy tempers the first form (i.e. by affirming the judge’s deliberate yielding to 
certain pre-determining preferences) it is only – at least on my reading – to pave the way for a 
more extreme commitment to the second (i.e. for the sake of political action).
 To clarify this point, we could reframe the Kennedy/Derrida distinction as follows: to quote 
Susanna Lindroos-Hovenheimo, the deconstructionist judge has a “twofold task when 
interpreting the legal text… [one] towards the text he is interpreting… [and one] towards the 
particular case which he is deciding.”505  But for Kennedy – and I am reading this as a fairly 
direct implication of his work – the first task must be de-emphasized insofar as it limits the 
capacity of the judge to deliver “real-world” justice to those before him.
 Now: on the one hand, “real-world” justice – or to be more precise, the deliverance of pure (i.e. 
purportedly indubitable) justice through a judicial decision/political arrangement – is precisely 
what deconstruction is supposed to throw into question.  But on the other hand, as Derrida says 
himself, there is something so “radical”506 and so admirable about projects like Kennedy’s –
projects which “aspire to something more consequential, to change things and to intervene”507
in the legal/social field.  The question then, is why Derrida identifies with and affirms a project 
which seems to be so much at-odds with his own.
                                               
504 Costas Douzinas & Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 2005) p.236
505 Susanna Lindroos-Hovenheimo, “Retracing One’s Steps: Searching for the Ethics of Legal Interpretation” 
(22 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 2009) p.165
506 “Derrida himself approvingly likens such... critical legal activism to the most radical [my emphasis] form of 
deconstruction” – Florian Hoffman, “Deadlines: Derrida and Critical Legal Scholarship” in Goodrich, Hoffman, 
Rosenfeld and Vismann, Derrida and Legal Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.194
507 “Force of Law” p.931
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 We can respond immediately with a second question: is Kennedy’s project at-odds with 
Derrida’s?  Perhaps Kennedy is not ignoring the judge’s “textual” responsibility so much as he 
is redefining its proper object, which is to say that – in the most radical sense – he is using the 
pliability of the interpretive process to deconstruct society-as-a-text; to re-democratize (i.e. re-
open) society for the sake of its “spectrified”508 (i.e. marginalized, silenced, repressed, etc.) 
minorities.
 In other words, maybe (just maybe) Kennedy’s approach is more a reinvigoration of the 
deconstructive “spirit” than a negation of it – a radicalization which, “in order to be consistent 
with itself, [refuses] to remain enclosed in [a] purely speculative, theoretical”509 realm of work.
 Of course, Kennedy’s politics - as politics - still represses; still cuts.  But then again, so does 
deconstruction.510  Think back to Derrida’s reading of Saussure: Derrida has to release and (in a 
certain way) privilege the counter-metaphysical side of the Course.  Only then – in the light of 
this realignment, this temporary “overturning”511 – can the multiple voices of the text be heard 
in their atonal unison; in their awkward, unabashed multiplicity.
 Can we not also see Kennedy this way?  For example: if Kennedy had presided over the 
infamous Bakke512 case, his personal politics would likely have led him to rule (as the court 
failed to) that universities are always justified in prioritizing a minority student admission over a 
non-minority one – regardless of whether the non-minority student holds a better academic 
record.  Now without question, this is a repressive ruling – a ruling that privileges one factor 
(i.e. minority status) over another (i.e. academic achievement) and which cares little for the 
singular, irreducible needs of any non-minority student who loses out.  However: can we not say 
that – in a certain way – this is repression only for the sake of liberation; for the sake of a distant 
day when such measures would be needless; for the sake of a disjointed, plural, open society to-
come (i.e. a justice-to-come)?
 We can only let this last question linger.  Does Kennedy go too far?  Or is this exactly what 
deconstruction is meant to do – to take action (as “we must”) in the name of liberation?  In other 
words, are Kennedy’s politics the politics of deconstruction?
                                               
508 My own (made-up) term, which I use here to reference the symbolism of Specters of Marx – specifically Derrida’s 
portrayal of the ghost as the “Other” of metaphysics.  See, for example, Specters of Marx, p.12
509 “Force of Law” p.931
510 “Deconstruction… is not neutral.  It intervenes [my emphasis]” – Positions, p.76
511 See Positions, p.38
512 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke – at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0438_0265_ZS.html
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CONCLUSION:
So: I have suggested that deconstruction begs for the radicalization of its own “spirit” of 
radicalization – a skeptical, inquisitive “spirit” which I have related to some of the West’s greatest 
minds: Socrates, Descartes, Marx, Wittgenstein, etc.  I have also suggested that this “spirit” is of an 
(anti-)ethical character, and that its pursuit is worthwhile because of this character.  Finally – in the 
section just passed – I have suggested that Duncan Kennedy’s argument for (emancipatory) judicial 
activism can be taken, perhaps, as a radical/pragmatic form of legal deconstructionism; a form 
which (implicitly) reinvents the textual object of deconstruction so as to better serve the needs of 
society’s others.
However, Kennedy’s deconstruction, as suggested, comes at the cost of the judge’s dedication to 
the (written) legal text, and we should therefore receive it for this failure as well as for its relative 
success.  And in this sense, Kennedy only pushes us back towards Derrida; back to his asking us –
in The Politics of Friendship – not to get too comfortable in the present.  Instead, we must look 
ahead, taking Kennedy’s gains and projecting them into the future – into the vortex of “the perhaps” 
in which their status (i.e. as progressions or as abominations) is anything but certain.  This is how 
(in order to be at least quasi-faithful to Derrida) I have to finish: by saying perhaps – to Kennedy for 
sure, but also to myself.  This is deconstruction.  Perhaps.
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